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Parliamentary Privilege 
Introduction 
'Privilege, Privilege' - these words echoed across the floor 
of the House of Commons when Charles I attempted to address 
the House over his request to arrest five members. Charles 
in his battles with Parliament met the executioner's axe, 
not a punishment likely to be repeated today. However, -according to Marshall 1 whilst privilege is a topic of -
interest to constitutional historians, some of the history 
of the subject is necessary in order to understand the 
questions posed today. The role of the House of 
Representatives in relation to other organs of the 
State, including the Courts, raises important constitutional 
questions. 
Whilst the Crown no longer threatens the Commons (nor do --Sheriffs or printers), Parliament here in New Zealand has 
many of the powers the Commons developed to deal with its 
opponents and potential or actual offenders against its 
privileges. Whether they are appropriate today remains to be 
seen. 
Geoffrey Marshall. 'The House of Commons and its 
privileges'. In the House of Commons in the Twentieth 
Century, edited by S.A. Walkland (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1979) 204. 
LA\V ll'."'r\t\ftY 
• • •'I y OF VJ::Lllf~GTON VICTOf':1.l. Ul·~,\i u -.,, ' 
This paper will refer to the great cases, and the conflict 
between the Courts and Parliament, whilst taking a more 
detailed look at some aspects of privilege. In particular, 
a study of the meaning of the term 'Proceedings in 
Parliament' and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688/9 
(Eng.) will be canvassed. The major privileges existing, 
whether of the Members, or of the House itself, will be 
considered, as will the procedures used in dealing with 
alleged breaches. Additionally, a review of the penalties 
available will be considered and the recent Bill introduced 
into the Australian Federal Houses will be analysed, and 
commented upon, particularly in respect of reform of the 
penalties available. 
2 
In looking at the subject-matter we will see that most 
precedents are found in the parliamentary records rather 
than the Law Reports. Judicial contributions
2 have been so 
small that judicial precedent is seldom relevant in 
determining a breach of privilege or contempt of Parliament. 
However, some judicial precedents are of fundamental 
constitutional importance, and due weight is attached to 
them in this paper. 
Reports of privilege committees are the nearest version to 
reasoned opinions. In the United Kingdom, the search for 
precedents is likely to lead to the standard source of 
Sir Thomas Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice,
3 now in its 
2 Enid Campbell. Parliamentary Privilege in Australia 
(Melbourne University Press, 1966), 7, hereafter Campbell. 
3 Erskine May. 'A Treatise on the Law, Privileges and Usage of 
Parliament' (20 Ed, Sir Charles Gordon Ed. London 
Butterworths, 1983), hereafter May. 
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twentieth edition, which according to Sands 4 has accumulated 
stratified layers of procedural silt over the decades, while 
in Australia the Senate has J.R. Odgers, 5 Australian Senate 
Practice in its fifth edition, and the first edition of 
House of Representatives Practice edited by J.A. Pettifer 6
 
(1980), and in New Zealand we now have David McGee's 
Parliamentary Practice, 7 and Littlejohn 1 s 8 Thesis on 
Parliamentary Privilege (1969). 
2.0 Historical Outline 
4 
5 
6 
2.1 House of Commons 
In order to review some of the history of this topic it 
is necessary to look at today's Parliament which could 
be described as having three types of Privilege. 
These are: 
( 1 ) exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising within 
the House (except perhaps Crimes)~ 
Roger Sands. Book Review of House of Representatives 
Practice, (Australia) Editor J.A. Pettifer (The Table 1978), 
152. 
J.R. Odgers. Australian Senate Practice (5 Edition Australian 
Government Publishing Service 1976), hereafter Odgers. 
House of Representatives Practice, Edited by J.A. Pettifer, 
(Australian Government Publishing Service 1981), hereafter 
Pettifer. 
7 D.G. McGee. Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (Government 
Printer 1985), hereafter McGee. 
8 C.P. Littlejohn. 'Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand'. 
(Thesis submitted for LL.M. Victoria University of Wellington 
1969), hereafter Little j ohn. 
(2) certain personal privileges possessed by 
individual members; and 
4 
(3) the power to execute its decisions by imprisonment 
or other means. 
How these privileges arose can be traced from the 
History of both the House of Commons, and the House of 
Lords. 
The origins of Parliament can be traced back to the 
Anglo-Saxon Great Council or Witenagemot.
9 This body 
after the Norman Conquest became the Curia Regis or 
Royal Courts, and the House of Lords retains its 
position as an appellate Court today. 
After Magna Carta in 1215 the rights of the Lords were 
confirmed, but the Lords alone had become incapable of 
effectively raising taxes, an early parliamentary 
function. So in addition to the Lords two Knights of 
the Shires and later two burgesses from eligible shires 
and boroughs were called to Parliament in 1254 and 
1264, respectively. This latter collection became known 
as Commoners to distinguish them from the Lords, and 
9 T.A . Plucknett. (Concise History of the Common Law 4 Ed.) 
132-137. 
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5 
then later becoming known as the House of Commons when 
they began to meet in a different Chamber to the Lords. 
The privileges of the Lords were due to their status as 
Lords, the King being an overlord. The Commons 
privileges became established over time. 
As early as 1308 10 writs of supersedas were issued to 
Justices of Assizes to stay proceedings against those 
attending Parliament. As the King commanded members 
presence, some method of stopping interference was 
necessary to ensure they could attend. This early 
privilege of freedom from arrest, however, depended 
upon the Lords and the King, who as Thorpe's case 
shows, were not always willing to enforce it. 11 Thorpe 
was Speaker of the House of Commons and lost a lawsuit 
in the Court of Exchequer (where he himself was a 
Judge) against the Duke of York, who was then the most 
powerful person in the Kingdom. He was fined and 
imprisoned until he paid. 
Viscount Kilrnuir. The Law of Parliamentary Privilege. 
(University of London 1959), 7 hereafter Kilmuir. 
Thorpe's case 1452; May,100. 
6 
The Commons petitioned the Lords for his release, the 
Lords sought the opin i on of the Judges, which was 
expressed by Sir John Fortescue, C.J. 
II .. the determination and knowlege of that 
privilege belongs to the Lords of Parliament, and 
not to the Just i ces 11 • 12 
The King told the Commons to elect another Speaker and 
quickly, which they did . May comments that the case has 
subsequently been criticised and is irregular and 
begotten by the iniquity of the times. 13 However, in 
Tudor times the Commons was able to exercise power in 
its own right as Strode's case 14 illustrates. Strode, a 
member of the Commons had proposed a bill to regulate 
the tin mines in Cornwall; he was prosecuted and 
12 Rotuli Parliamentium, iii, 239 (1454). 
13 May, 183. 
14 (1512), 4 Parl Hist 85. 
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7 
imprisoned by the Stannard Court, a Stannary Court. 
This resulted in the Act known as Strode's Act 15 which 
provided that any proceedings against Strode and any 
other member of any Parliament "for any bill, speaking 
or declaring of any matter concerning the Parliament" 
be void and ineffective. This Act has subsequently been 
interpreted as a general Act applicable to all members 
f 1 . 16 o Par 1ament. 
Thus a privilege of free speech came to be recognised 
in statute form and, after further disputes, was 
confirmed in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688-89: 
'That the freedom of speech, and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or place 
outside Parliament.' 
Conflicts with Courts over aspects of parliamentary 
privilege have not been confined to minor Courts and 
will be dealt with briefly below by way of introduction 
and also in section 7 of this paper. 
15 4 Hen 8, c 8. 
16 May, 79 / 80 (12 and 13 November 1667). 
8 
The conflicts became political with the Commons seeking 
its independence; the fact that Judges were appointed 
and were removable by the Crown meant that Judges were 
unlikely to make decisions against the King. Holdsworth 
describes the use by Charles II and James II over 
judicial appointments as, "Unfortunately the issue has 
become obscured ..• by the bias of the Judges in 
favour of the Crown" . 17 
According to Keeton 18 "both Charles II and James II •.• 
dismissed Judges repeatedly when they no longer acted 
as instruments of Government policy". The higher 
judiciary only achieved tenure by the Act of Settlement 
1701. 
The 17th Century was also a time of keen competition 
between the various law courts, 19 Coke, C.J. even 
declaring that the Common law courts had the power to 
declare laws made by Parliament to be invalid if they 
transgressed certain principles of Common law. 20 
Eliot's case 21 illustrates an attack on the freedom of 
17 H.E.L. Vol. IV 88-89. 
18 G.W. Keeton. English Law. (The Judicial Contribution 1974), 
139. 
19 P.S. Pachauri. The Law of Parliamentary Privileges in the 
U.K. and in India. (N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1971) 45, 
hereafter Pachauri. 
20 H.E.L. Vol. 210. 
21 3 State Trials 332. 
( 
C 
9 
speech privilege. Eliot and two other members were 
prosecuted for using seditious words in the House, and 
defying an order that the House adjourn, by holding the 
Speaker physically down in his seat. The King's Bench 
whilst acknowledging civil immunity held them liable 
for criminal words, this decision being based on the 
view that Strode's Act did not apply generally to all 
members. This situation was corrected by the Lords, as 
\ 
they agreed to a Commons resolution that Strode's Act 
extended to all Members of Parliament,
22 and 
subsequently a Writ of Error was issued and agreed in 
1668. However, the Commons had determined that its 
privileges should not be judged elsewhere than before 
itself. 23 
This approach has been taken to extremes
24 with Judges 
who have pronounced on questions of privilege being 
summoned before the House for contempt.In Jay v 
25 Topham, Topham, the Serjeant-at-Arms, was the subject 
of an action for arresting and detaining the plaintiff 
on the orders of the House for a breach of privilege; 
his plea of privilege was overruled and judgment given 
against him. Sir Francis Pemberton and Sir Thoma's 
Jones, the King's Bench Judges involved, were ordered 
before the House and finally committed into the 
22 CJ (1667-87) 19, 25; LJ (1666-75) 166, 223; May 80. 
23 Anson. The Law and Customs of the Constitution (5 Ed. Vol. 1, 
167-8. 
24 Campbell 5. 
I 
25 12 State Trials 821. 
10 
custody of the Serjeant-of-Arms. May 26 states that the 
case has attracted judicial criticism, which seems 
hardly surprising. Arresting and imprisoning Judges is 
hardly likely to escape judicial notice. Pachauri 
points out the two Judges confessed that they had given 
27 no reason for the overruling of the Serjeant's plea, 
and the House apparently suspected the bona fides of 
the Judges, their suspicions being reinforced by a 
$10,000 fine imposed on the Speaker by another Judge, 
for ordering publication in the House precincts, of a 
paper reflecting on the Duke of York (late/ James II) 
which the House was considering the same day. The 
House did not even divide when considering committal of 
the Judges. 
This sort of case might seem unlikely to occur again 
but as late as 1964 in the Legislative Assembly of 
Uttar Pradesh (India) an order of the Assembly required 
two State High Court Judges to be arrested and produced 
before the Bar of the House to face a breach of 
privilege charge, which produced a constitutional 
. . 28 h . f cr1s1s. Te case involved re erral to the Indian 
Supreme Court on a question of interpretation of the 
Indian Constitution; nevertheless the illustration 
26 May, 18 6. 
27 Pachauri, 284, 302; H.C.J. (1688-93) 227. 
28 Shanti Brushaa. Parliamentary Privileges (Journal of 
Parliamentary Information, Vol. 24, No . 2 Apl-June 1978). 
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11 
is still of value, raising this question, which is 
essentially the same question as in Jay v Topham -
should Judges be imprisoned for contempt of Parliament? 
Other questions are raised too such as the nature of 
} contempt and who decides. These questions are addressed 
in para. 3.0 and 9.0 below. 
Lex et Consuetudo Parliamenti 
The common law courts came to decline jurisdiction at 
the mention of the Law of Parliament, as can be seen 
from the development of the cases. R. v Paty 29 
illustrates this trend. However, a second body of law 
has grown since the Courts have undertaken some review 
of matters of privilege. Such decisions as Paty's 
case, 30 Stockdale v Hansard, 31 and the case of the 
Sheriff of Middlesex, 32 are major judicial landmarks, 
. hb h. 33 as 1s As y v W 1te. Ashby sued a returning officer 
for maliciously refusing to accept his vote in an 
election. This was a tort action in the Queen's Bench. 
,/ 
29 R v Paty and other (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1105. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 A & E 1. 
32 The Sheriff of Middlesex's Case (1840) 11 A & E. 
33 (1704) 2 Ld Raym 938; 92 Eng Rep 232 (1704). 
12 
Holt C.J. dissented but his dissenting judgement was 
later upheld in the Lords. According to Heuston, 
Halt's dissenting judgement is one of the masterpieces 
h d 1 d h . . l 34 oft e law reports an ays own tree pr1nc1p es: 
(1) Ubi jus ibi remedium i.e., where there is a right 
there is a remedy, in the plaintiff's case, the 
right to vote, 
(2) A rebuttal of the argument that no precedent 
existed, as novelty was itself no reason for 
refusing a remedy; 
(3) He rebutted the argument that this was a 
parliamentary matter over which the Commons had 
exclusive jurisdiction, as in his opinion the 
right to vote was outside the jurisdiction of the 
House. 
Following this case Paty 35 and 4 others brought similar 
actions. The Commons were not prepared to accept the 
Court's jurisdiction and committed to prison both the 
plaintiffs and their counsel. On habeas corpus 
proceedings to secure their release the Court held they 
had no jurisdiction. Appeals were considered, conflict 
with the House of Lords arose, which joint conferences 
34 R.F.V. Heuston. Parliamentary Privilege in (Essays in 
Constitutional Law, Stevens 1964) 82-83, hereafter Heuston. 
35 Supra note 29. 
.I 
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13 
were unable to settle, the matter being resolved by a 
proroguing of Parliament by Queen Anne. 
In Stockdale v Hansard 36 Stockdale sued Hansard for a 
libel contained in a report, ordered to be published by 
the House; the Court found for the defendant on a plea 
of justification. Meanwhile a parliamentary select 
committee, and subsequently the House, 37 resolved that: 
1. 
2 • 
3 • 
4 . 
Publication of parliamentary reports and 
proceedings was essential to the functions of 
Parliament; 
The House of Commons had sole jurisdiction to 
determine the existence and extent of this 
privilege; 
To dispute these privileges by legal proceedings 
was itself a breach of orivilege; and 
For any Court to decide on matters of privilege 
inconsistent with the determination of either 
House was contrary to the Law of Parliament. 
36 Supra note 31. 
37 Heuston 86-92; D.L. Keir amd F.H. Lawson. Cases in 
Constitutional Law 5 Ed. (Clarendon Press 1967) 270-283; 
May, 190. 
14 
Then Stockdale instituted a second libel action. 
Hansard pleaded, on instruction of the House, 
"privilege". Stockdale suing on the modern equivalent 
of legal aid was assigned Curwood as counsel; facing 
him was the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, 
Pollock (later Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, 
Maile and Wrightman (future Judges). After lengthy 
argument the Court upheld Stockdale. The Court decided 
that privilege was part of the law of the land and it 
was for ordinary Courts to determine whether or not any 
privilege existed, and in this instance the privilege 
claimed did not exist. The Court said that if by 
resolution of one House defamatory material could be 
published, this was an alteration of the law which 
could only occur by statute. Damages for £100 were 
assessed, and paid by the House. 
A third action was started. Hansard declined to 
appear, merely sending a copy of the House's resolution 
of 1837 (points 1-4 above). Judgment was given, this 
time for £600; this was obtained from Hansard's office 
on an execution warrant by the Sheriff. The Sheriff 
however retained the money fearing the consequences if 
he paid it over. 
The House acted first to remove the dilemma. The 
Sheriffs were called to the bar of the House. They 
duly arrived formally dressed in scarlet robes, were 
asked if they had anything to say, bowed and withdrew. 
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15 
Next day they were committed into custody on a 
Speaker's warrant. The Sheriffs attempted to obtain a 
writ of habeas corpus. On the return of the writ the 
Court held (adopting the principle of Paty's case) 38 
that if the warrant showed sufficient facts, and these 
facts showed no reasonable grounds for committal, the 
Court would review it. If however the writ showed no 
reasons then the Court had no power to review for 
contempt generally. Consequently, the House can commit 
in general terms and no Court may review this, with the 
result that only political pressure can avail to 
release imprisoned persons from custody imposed by 
order of the Speaker acting on behalf of the House. 
This second body of law which commentators describe as 
dualism (i.e. the unresolved incompatibility of the 
powers the Commons and the Courts both claim to have) 
that is created is considered further in para. 4.1.1 
and section 7 of this paper. 
Subsequently the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 was 
passed which conferred absolute privilege on documents 
ordered to be published. The Commons therefore 
impliedly abandoned its claim put forward in Stockdale 
v Hansard by concurring in the passing of the 1840 
Act. 39 
38 Supra note 29. 
39 Heuston, 91. 
16 
2.,3 New Zealand 
In 1852 representative Government arrived in New 
Zealand replacing the earlier dependence status, and 
the more recent status as a Crown Colony. The New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) (15 & 16 Viet c72) 
did not expressly grant privileges, and McGee states 
h h . f 1 1 · . 40 tat t 1s was o concern to ear y par 1amentar1ans. 
Section 52 of the Act provided that the Legislative 
Council and . House of Representatives -
shall prepare standing orders •• • provided no 
such rule shall be of force to subject any person 
not being a membe r or of ficer 
penalty, or forfeiture . 
to any pain , 
A select committee was set up t o inquire into 
pr i vilege, and it reported
41 that the House had no 
inherent right or privilege but that it could claim 
privileges at Common Law incidental to its functions as 
a legislative body, in accordance with the Privy 
Council decision in Keilly v Carson.
42 The main 
privilege which the House did not have was the power to 
40 McGee, 422. 
41 Littlejohn, 19. 
42 (1841) 4 Moore 89. 
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17 
punish contempt. 43 Two years later the Privileges Act 
1856 was passed. This together with various amending 
Acts is now incorporated in the Legislature Act 1908. 
Section 242 (1) reads -
[The House of Representatives] 
Committees and members thereof . 
. and the 
. shall hold, 
enjoy, and exercise such and the like privileges, 
immunities, and powers as on the 1st day of 
January 1865 were held, enjoyed, and exercised by 
the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and by the Committees and members 
thereof, so far as the same are not inconsistent 
with or repugnant to such of the provisions of the 
Constitution Act as on the 26th day of September 
1865 (being the date of the coming into operation 
of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865) were 
unrepealed, whether such privileges, immunities, 
or powers were so held, possessed, or enjoyed by 
custom, statute, or otherwise. 
The formula used of adopting the Commons privileges of 
1865 in this country is a fairly common one having been 
adopted in Canada, Bahamas, and the Australian 
] 43 Supra McGee. 
18 
Federal Parliament and some of the Australian States, 
all at various dates, e.g. Victoria 1855, Western 
Australia 1891. This does tend to create a 
Commonwealth wide form of precedent albeit the statutes 
'd . l 44 are not 1 ent1ca • 
Clearly, as a result of adopting the 1865 privileges of 
the Commons, the early English precedents quoted in 
this paper are applicable also in New Zealand. The 
House of Commons did not as at 1865 possess power to 
create any new privileges, this being agreed as early 
as 1704 in an assent by the Commons to a Lords 
resolution as an aftermath to the Paty 45 case. 
Consequently any new privileges the House wishes to 
adopt must now be created by legislation. 
Little change has occurred over the 120 years since the 
enactment of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865 
46 except procedurally. Following a recent review of the 
44 McGee, 424. 
45 CJ (1702-04) 555, 559-63; May 76; Supra note 29. 
46 Littlejohn. Privilege in the New Zealand Parliament (The 
Parliamentarian, July 1972) 190. 
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19 
Standing Orders in 1979 the House has adopted not only 
the lessons learned from New Zealand privilege cases, 
but some of the recommendations of the 1966-67 4 ~ and 
1976
48 
Select Committees on Parliamentary Privilege 
reports of the U.K. Parliament. These points are 
discussed in the procedure section 6 infra. 
3.0 Definition and Purposes of Privilege 
3.1 What is Privilege? 
49 d f" . ·1 May e 1nes pr1v1 ege as: 
••. the sum of peculiar rights enjoyed by each House 
collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of 
Parliament, and by the members of each House 
individually, without which they could not discharge 
their functions, and which exceed those possessed by 
other bodies or individuals. 
47 Report of the Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege 
H.C. 34 (1967-68). 
48 H.C. 417 (1976-77). 
49 May, 70. 
20 
Thus privilege 1 part of the law of the land, is to 
a certain extent an exemption. 
Pettifer comments that privilege relates to the rights 
and immunities of Parliament, its members and others. 
These rights and immunities allow Parliament to meet 
and carry out its constitutional role, without fear of 
obstruction or fear of prosecution. 50 
Historically, privilege can be justified by analogy 
with judicial practice, Halsell states that Courts have 
privileges auxiliary to their powers - so witnesses and 
Judges speak freely and they are released from other 
tasks. So too provision is made for 'the Court of 
Parliament, the first and the highest Court in the 
. d , 51 King om. 
3.2 A Court? 
McGee commenting on?• 242 (1) of the Legislature Act, 
says 'the subsection does not make the House a Court,' 
but, he adds, it does give the House attributes enjoyed 
by part of a Court. (The House of Commons is a part of 
50 Pettifer, 642. 
51 J. Halsell. Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 
(1796) Vol. 1, 1. 
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the High Court of Parliament and, therefore, has powers 
to punish as a Court . ) 52 Recalling Halsell's judicial 
analogy of auxiliary powers above, and Marshall 1 s 53 
observation of the fact that the Commons is a Court, 
does not detract from the reality that in this 
twentieth century the Commons is not a Court and 
certainly the New Zealand House is not. However, both 
clearly possess political power which could be seen 
when employed as utilising a 'quasi judicial power'. 
Marshall pursuing the former point indicates that a 
distinction between powers inherent for a legislative 
Chamber to function properly, and the power to punish 
can perhaps be made. 
The power to punish is not a necessary ingredient of 
legislative authority and the Common Law did not 
· · 5 4 th t . h . . d . . 1 t recognise 1t; e power o pun1s 1s a JU 1c1a no 
legislative power. The judicial ancestry of the 
British Parliament, and the device of conferring 
Westminster powers on overseas leg islatures, has 
52 McGee, 424. 
53 Marshall, 205. 
54 Keill y and Carson (1842) 4 Moore 63 • 
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perhaps led to the conclusion that the power to punish 
is an inherent privilege, whereas in reality, power to 
punish has been conferred by statute in most 
jurisdictions taking the Commons powers at a particular 
dateo New South Wales, interestingly enough, still 
only possesses Common law powers. 
3.3 Privilege or Contempt? 
The distinction between the terms privilege and 
contempt is somewhat difficult and the terms have 
become virtually synonymous to many including the 
. . f b . l. d d · 55 h maJor1ty o mem ers, Journa 1sts an aca em1cs. Te 
distinction according to Pachauri is not often 
apparent, as contempts are also called breaches of 
privilege and in either case questions of contempt or 
breaches of privilege are raised in the House as a 
question of privilege. 
In principle, privilege is the right enjoyed by the 
House collectively and by the members individually, 
designed to secure the proper discharge of their 
f . d . l. h 56 unct1ons an 1s pecu 1ar tot em. The power to 
punish for contempt could be listed as a soecific 
privilege; it is not limited to punishment of 
recognised prjvjJeges.57 
5 5 Marshall, 206. 
56 Ibid. 
57 May , 71. 
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A contempt is an act or omission which obstructs or 
impedes the House, its members or officers in the 
discharge of their duty, or at least has the tendency 
to do so. Most contempts can be linked to infringement 
of freedom of speech or molestation, as the legislative 
function requires free speech (e.g. refusal of 
witnesses to attend, reflections on members). 
In practice, the significant difference between 
contempt and breach of privilege is that actions 
without exact precedents can be treated as a cause for 
committal, with the limitation that the House is unable 
to create new privileges,
58 as historically the only 
judge of the existence of the privilege and its extent 
is the House. 
Sir Kenneth Pickthorn,
59 a lawyer and member of the 
Committee of Privilege of the Commons observed, "I have 
often been taught the difference between contempt and 
breach of privilege • . but I always forget it as 
soon as I am taught it," and Sir Gilbert Campion 
similarly giving evidence before another Committee of 
58 Supra para. 2.3. 
59 Committee of Privilege H.C. 247 (1963-64) 18. 
Privilege said, "I think this case bristles with 
contempt. It is contempt and therefore a breach of 
privilege . • An affront to the dignity of the 
24 
House would itself be a contempt and therefore a breach 
of privilege." 60 The distinction becomes clearer from 
the following extract from Halsbury: 
Distinction between offences. 
The power of both Houses of Parliament to punish 
for contempt is a general power similar to that 
possessed by the superior courts of law and is not 
restricted to the punishment of breaches of their 
acknowledged privileges. Any act or omission 
which obstructs or impedes either House in the 
performance of its functions, or which obstructs 
or impedes any member or officer of the House in 
the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency 
to produce such a result, may be treated as a 
contempt even if there is no precedent for the 
offence. Certain offences which were formerly 
described as contempts are now commonly designated 
breaches of privilege, although that term more 
properly applies only to infringements of the 
rights or immunities of one of the Houses of 
Parliament. 61 
60 H.C. Paper No. 138 (1946-7) Evidence Q.2. 
61 Halsbury's Laws of England (4 Ed. Vol. 28 para. 1500); 
Pettifer 644. 
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Enumeration of Privileges 
The following enumeration of privileges shows the principal 
privileges, powers and immunity enjoyed by the House of 
Representatives and its members: 
The right of free speech in Parliament; Article 9 of 
Bill of Rights 1688/9. 
Immunity of Members (and officers) from civil arrest 
whilst attending Parliament and for 40 days after every 
prorogation and for 40 days prior to the start of a new 
session. 
Rights, consequential powers and immunities of House of 
Representatives. 
Power to regulate its proceedings by standing orders 
having the force of law, free from interference by the 
Courts. 
Determining the right to sit in the House (after the 
provisions of the Electoral Act have been complied 
with). 
The power to suspend or expel members (in addition to 
powers contained in Electoral Act). 
26 
The power to arrest (by Speaker's warrant) persons 
guilty of contempt or breach of privilege . 
Power to imprison, fine (see section 7 below), 
reprimand, or exclude from the precincts for contempt 
or breach of privilege. 
Right to administer oaths to witnesses (in addition to 
powers contained ins. 253 Legislature Act 1908) . 
The list above does not purport to be exclusive and other 
privileges exist; however, in the light of the length of 
this paper, it is not proposed to deal with all privileges, 
only those selected below. 
4.1 Freedom of Speech 
"Unquestionably freedom of speech is the far most important 
privilege of members." 62 Certainly it is the best known of 
the privileges. Odgers, 63 quoting from the House of Commons 
1967 Select Committee report on parliamentary privilege, 
reminds us that in truth the privilege of freedom of speech 
is the privilege of the constituents. It is secured for 
members to enable them to carry out their job without fear 
62 Pettifer, 645. 
63 Odgers, 638. 
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of civil or criminal actions. Prof Campbe11 64 adds 
that without it Parliament would degenerate into a 
polite but ineffectual debating society • 
The privilege whilst finally being confirmed in Article 
9 of the Bill of Rights, can be traced back to Strode's 
Act 1512 65 and even before. The nature of this 
privilege is that it gives absolute privilege to 
members, only in respect of anything said in the course 
of proceedings in Parliament. 
One of the major areas of contention, is what 
constitutes "proceedings in Parliament". Not 
everything occurring in Parliament is necessarily 
"proceedings". As judicially determined it is more 
than just voting and speaking, e.g., no action for 
slander will lie for statements made by witnesses 
before a select cornrnittee, 66 and control of the House's 
own internal affairs lies within the meaning. 67 A great 
deal of debate has occurred over the meaning of the 
words. In 1967 the Clerk of the House of Commons, in a 
supplementary memorandum to the 1967 Select Committee, 
said: 
64 Campbell 28. 
65 4 Hen 8 c 8, supra para. 2.0. 
66 Goffin v Donnelly (1881} 6 QBD 307. 
67 Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271; S.A. de Smith. 
Parliamentary Privilege and Bill of Rights ( Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 121} 21, hereafter de Smith. 
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"The primary meaning, as a technical parliamentary 
term, of 'proceedings ' (which obtained at least as 
early as the seventeenth century) is some formal 
action, usually a decision, taken by the House in its 
collective capacity. This is naturally extended both 
to the forms of business on which the House takes 
action and to the whole process, the principal part of 
which is debate, by which the House reaches a decision. 
"An i ndividual member takes part in proceedings usually 
by speech, but also by various recognised kinds of 
formal action, such as voting, giving notice of a 
motion, etc., or presenting a petition or a report from 
a committee, most of such actions being time-saving 
substitutes for speaking. Officers of the House take 
part in its proceedings principally by carrying out its 
orders, general or particular. Strangers can also take 
part in the proceedings of the House, e.g. by giving 
evidence before one of its committees, or by presenting 
petitions for or against private bills. 
"While taking part in the proceedings of the House, 
members, officers and strangers are protected by the 
same sanction as that by which freedom of speech is 
protected, namely, that they cannot be called to 
account for their actions by any authority other than 
the House itself." 68 
68 HC 34 (1967-68) 9. 
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Uncertainty, however, still remains with what 
"proceedings" are. The meaning was extensively 
canvassed in the 1957 Strauss Case (London Electricity 
Board Case); the uncertainty resulting from this case 
led to the 1967 Select Committee to recommend 
effectively defining proceedings in Parliament - which 
to date has not occurred. 
4 . 1.1 Strauss Case 69 
On February 8, 1957 Mr Strauss, a former Minister of 
Supply, wrote to the Paymaster-General (the Commons 
representative of the Minister of Power, Lord Mills) 
complaining about the method of tendering for scrap 
metal of the London Electricity Board. He mentioned 
his indirect personal financial interest, and stated 
that the behaviour of the Board was "a scandal which 
should be instantly rectified". The Minister replied 
that such matters were of day-to-day administration and 
he would draw it to the attention of the Chairman of 
the Board whose responsibility it was. After further 
correspondence the Board through their solicitors told 
Mr Strauss that if these allegations were not withdrawn 
and an apology made, libel proceedings would be 
brought. He replied; his reply was unsatisfactory to 
the Board, and they stated a writ would be issued the 
following week. 
69 H.C. 305 (1956-57) and acknowledgement for substantial 
material for this section from de Smith, 465-483. 
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On April 8, 1957 Mr Strauss complained to the House 
that the letters were a breach of privilege in that 
they were calculated to i mpede him in the performance 
of his parliamentary duties (no writ being issued in 
the meantime). The Speaker ruled that a prima facie 
case existed and referred the matter to the Committee 
of Privileges. On October 30, 1957 the committee 
reported the conclusions being adopted by a majority 
were : 
(1) Mr Strauss's letter to the Paymaster-General was a 
"proceeding in Parliament" within the meaning of 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights and absolute 
privilege attached; 
(2) That the London Electricity Board in threats by 
letters from themselves and their solicitors had 
acted in breach of privilege in threatening to 
question in a Court or place out of Parliament, 
the freedom (of speech) of Mr Strauss; 
(3) The opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council should be sought on the question whether 
the House would be acting contrary to the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, 70 if it treated 
70 10 Geo 3, c50. 
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the issue of a writ against a member of Parliament 
in respect of a speech or proceeding by him in 
Parliament as a breach of its privileges • 
It also recommended that the matter be referred 
back to it when the opinion of the Judicial 
Committee was obtained • 
Upon moving a resolution of the House that the matter 
be referred to the Judicial Committee, the Leader of 
the House, R.A. Butler, stated his belief that the 
House was master of its own privileges, but it was 
important in the House to obtain the highest legal 
opinion on the interpretation of a statute affecting a 
privilege. The motion was carried 164 to 106. de Smith 
points out that under section 4 of the Judicial 
Committee Act 1833 a special reference can be made, and 
no implied surrender of power is made, as the decision 
is in no way binding. 71 Moreover, on decisions (1) and 
(2) the House did not refer to the Judicial Committee. 
The Commons had adopted a resolution in 1837
72 that 
"the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
existence and extent of privileges" elsewhere than 
Parliament was a high breach of privilege. 
71 de Smith, 467. 
72 C.J. (1837) 418-9. 
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On two previous occasions to this opinions of the 
73 Judicial Committee were soughto However, this one 
diff~red as it was asking for advice on the extent of 
its privilege rather than a proper application of an 
. d . · 1 74 unquest1one pr1v1 ege. 
An Order in Council was made referring the matter, and 
the Judicial Committee held that the House would not be 
acting against the 1770 Act to treat the issue of a 
writ as a breach of privilege. 75 The 1770 Act provided 
that actions brought against members should not be 
stayed "by or under colour or pretence of any privilege 
of Parliament"; this the Privy Council said applied 
only to debts and actions as individuals, i.e. the 1770 
Act did not impliedly repeal the Bill of Rights, it 
referred only to proceedings against members in their 
private not public capacity. 76 
73 Re Sir Stuart Samuel [1913] AC 514; Re Rev J.G. MacManaway 
[ 19 51] AC 161 . 
74 de Smith, 467. 
75 [1958] AC 331. 
76 Whether the 1770 Act is in force in New Zealand is 
questionable. The N.S.W. Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 
repealed it in N.S.W. despite the doubts expressed by the 
N.S.W. Law Reform Ccmrn.ission; similarly Victoria and A.C.T. 
expressed doubts but also repealed it. In the explanatory 
note to the Imperial Laws Application Bill (No. 2), a note 
draws attention to this and other Imperial Acts and concludes 
the Law of Privilege should be dealt with elsewhere. The 
better view is that the Act is in force here not by virtue of 
English Laws Act 1908 s. 2 but bys. 242 Legislature Act. 
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When the Commons considered the decision of the Privy 
Council, it was not disputed and most of the members 
were content to accept the Committee of Privileges' 
view that the House could treat the threat of the issue 
of a writ as a breach. In essence the question was, as 
de Smith 77 puts it, did Mr Strauss's letter fall within 
the ambit of Article 9? 
It is interesting to now note that Lord Denning, who 
sat on the case, was in fact the only one of the seven 
law lords to dissent. At the time, of course, 
dissenting judgements were not made and decisions 
appeared unanimous. His dissent appeared in an 1985 
bl . . l 78 Pu 1c Law art1c e. 
Heuston 79 states that the Judicial Committee did not 
express any opinion on whether the mere issue of a writ 
would be a breach. His view is that it is not, it 
only becomes one if the Court considers the action. 
For 200 years the Courts have not considered the issue 
of legal proceedings to be a breach, as it is the right 
of every subject to have recourse to the Courts. 
77 de Smith, 471. 
78 The Rt Hon Lord Denning. Annex on the Strauss Case. (Public 
Law, Spring 85), 80-92. 
79 Heuston, 96. 
4. 1. 2 
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The House rece i ved t he J udicial Committee report and 
. f . · 1 80 referred it t o the Commit tee o Pr1v1 eges. The 
Committee of Pr i v i leges r epeated its earlier findings 
and recommended that in v iew of the fact that no writ 
had been issued, and t hat this was the first case of 
i ts kind , no further ac ti on be taken. 
On a non party vote a mot ion to accept the committee 
report was defeated by 218 to 213. An amendment which 
had t he effect of dete rm i ning that Mr Strauss ' s letter 
was not a proceeding in Parliament, and that replies 
from the Board and the ir Solicitors, did not 
consequentially commit a breach of privilege was 
carried . 
Subsequently, the Board a nnounced it proposed not to 
proceed with any act ion a nd asked the Minister to hold 
an independent inquiry . 
Article 9 of the Bill o f Rights 
Looking again at the wor ds used in the Bill of Rights 
Article 9, "The freedom of speech and debates 
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court o r place out of Parliament" 
80 589 HC Deb 1058. 
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implies an exclusive right to regulate proceedings by 
the House itself, and it is worth remembering that it 
is within the powers of the House to treat members' 
words as contempt . 
May 81 states that cases in which members have been 
called to account for offensive words used are too 
numerous to mention • 
The article primarily declares freedom of speech in 
Parliament, already affirmed in 1s12 82 and in Eliot's 
Case, 83 to the extent that no person can be convicted 
of criminal proceedings, or judgement entered against 
them in civil proceedings in respect of participating 
in proceedings in Parliament; in particular, absolute 
privilege applies in any libel action. It also implies 
that members abusing the privilege can be disciplined 
by the House and that any outside interference with 
1 . d' . b h f . · 1 84 par 1amentary procee 1ngs 1s a reac o pr1v1 ege. 
Whatever assumptions are made by the Commons with 
respect to privileges, the Courts have since Stockdale 
v Hansard reserved the right to examine the claim of 
May, 86. 
8 2 4 Hen 8 c8 . 
83 1668 3 St Tr 294. 
84 de Smith, 469. 
privilege, as they hold t he law and custom of 
Parliament to be part of the general law. 
36 
The House can impr i son 85 for a breach, and has done so, 
even Judges have been committed, but successful 
imposition of Parliament ' s viewpoint is not necessarily 
the same as an authoritative declaration of law. 86 
Palmer 87 comments that it may seem strange that the 
(English) Constitution can tolerate the doubts and 
difficulties of two doctrines of privilege, but it 
does . Quoting May's passage, "The decisions of the 
Court are not accepted as binding by the House in 
matters of privilege, nor the decisions of the House by 
the Courts", he comments that the Judicial Committee in 
Re Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 [1958] AC 331 at pp 
353-4, cites this passage with approval. 
Palmer is also critical of Heuston's proposition 88 that 
the Commons does accept the Court's authority. 
de Smith points out that in no case since 1689 has a 
Court expressly recognised that defamation proceedings 
85 Jay v Topham (1689) 12 St Tr 822, supra note 25. 
86 de Smith, 470. 
87 G.W.R. Palmer, Adam Clayton Powell and John Wilkes (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 56), 753 (hereafter Palmer; and see para 7.0 infra. 
88 Supra note 79. 
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being instituted constitute a breach of privilege, and 
as the views of the Commons are not conclusive, some 
. . 89 . . uncertainty remains. Legal sanctions exist against 
malicious prosecutors and cranks, and a person 
instituting proceedings bound to fail is unlikely to be 
aware of parliamentary privilege, and unaffected 
therefore by its deterrent value . 
4.l e3 Proceedings in Parliament? 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Recalling the definition of proceedings in 
Parliament, 90 this definition has seldom been 
considered by the Courts directly; however, the Courts 
have recognised that the House has an exclusive control 
of its own affairs 91 , a right explicit in Article 9. 
Despite the fact that R v Graham-Campbell ex 
92 p.Herbert does not mention the Bill of Rights, the 
case involves the meaning of proceedings in Parliament, 
the facts of which are that A.P. Herbert (later elected 
as an M.P. in 1935 and author of Uncommon Law), laid an 
information against members of the Kitchen Committee 
for breach of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910, 
for selling liquor without a licence. The magistrate 
de Smith, 4 71. 
Supra note 68. 
Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271; supra section 2; 
infra section 7 • 
[1935] l KB 594. 
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refused to issue a summons on the grounds of privilege, 
albeit Herbert and his friend were the consumers of the 
drink. Mr Herbert commenced proceedings for mandamus 
in the Divisional Court, but the Court held it was a 
domestic parliamentary matter outside the jurisdiction 
of the Law Courts as a proceeding in Parliament. This 
represents the extreme point as to the meaning of 
"proceedings in Parliament" or the internal affairs of 
Parliamento 
h d . . h . h . . . 93 b 1194 Te ec1s1on as met wit some cr1t1c1sm. Camp e 
discussing a statute dealing directly with proceedings 
in Parliament states, "The position with respect to a 
statute dealing with activities which may be carried on 
outside as well as inside Parliament and which have no 
connection with the legislative process or the 
discussion of public affairs is entirely different". 
She continues, "It would seem absurd to suppose the 
Houses of Parliament alone have authority to determine 
whether the Act is applicable within the precincts of 
Parliament, and if so, how the Act is to be interpreted 
and applied." This however seems to be the inference 
d f H b 95 k96 . h' . rawn rom exp. er ert. Loe 1n 1s article 
93 Campbell, 78. 
94 Ibid. 
95 R v Graham-Campbell exp. Herbert [1935] 1 KB 594. 
96 G.F. Lock. Parliamentary Privilege and the Courts: The Avoidance of Conflict, (Public Law, Spring 85), 67. 
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refers to Prof de Smith calling this" . • • remarkably 
generous view of the scope of the internal affairs of 
the Commons 11 , 97 and Hartley and Griffith that " [this] 
seems to take a remarkably wide view of what 
• d • • l' II 98 constitutes a procee 1ng 1n Par 1ament • 
Returning to more sober matters, not every matter 
occurring in Parliament will attract privilege. A 
private conversation between members in the House 99 
seems unlikely to attract privilege if defamatory, or a 
letter posted in the parliamentary post-box to an 
M.P.lOO de Smith observes that a letter written by a 
member to a Minister at the latter's request to supply 
further information in connection with a Question on 
the Order Paper is protected.lOl The Speaker's ruling 
stated: 
I am merely stating that to my mind, and I think 
to most Hon. Members' minds, a matter which arises 
from a Question on the Order Paper in Parliament 
stands in a different position from a matter such 
97 S.A. Smith. Constitutional and Administrative Law (4 Ed 
1981), 325. 
98 T.C. Hartley and J.A.G. Griffith, Government and Law 1975, 
434. 
99 Coffin v Coffin (1808) 4 Mass 1. 
] 100 Rivlin v Bilainhin [1953] 1 QB 485. 
101 91 H.C. Debates 809-13. 
4.1.4 
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as we were discussing the other day [i.e. The 
Strauss Case] as regards being a proceeding in 
Parliament. There is no doubt that this Question 
is a proceed ing in Parliament. 
de Smith raises some interesting points in relation to 
102 outstanding problems . Does a member achieve article 
9 protection by notify ing the minister that unless his 
letter receives a satisfactory reply he will ask a 
Question on the Order Paper? or if the Minister does 
not have day-to-day responsibility so cannot be 
expected to answer it at Question time, will a 
notification that the Member will debate it attract 
Article 9 protection? The answers remain to be seen. 
Certainly compla ints in respect of subject-matter in 
which the recipient has significant interest would have 
qualified privilege in the field of defamation. This 
qualified privilege is rebuttable by malice being 
shown. 
Absolute or Qualified Privilege? 
Dr Marsha11 103 suggests that a constitutional 
iconoclast (if there be any) might even raise the 
102 de Smith, 480. 
103 Marshall, 213. 
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question whether absolute privilege that is conceded to 
some judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (e.g. 
Ombudsmen) and lawyers-client and to Court witnesses is 
really justified in a deliberative assembly. To my 
mind de Smith raises this very question (and does not 
fit the iconoclast description). He asks how much 
evidence is there that local authorities are 
incapacitated in investigating abuses whilst only 
having qualified privilege, 104 a point that Dr Marshall 
makes too. 105 
Policy arguments in favour of absolute privilege are 
easily found . It is often the duty of a member of 
Parliament to expose scandal and his comments might be 
defamatory, and it would hardly be sensible to put 
everything down as a parliamentary Question. Letters 
are often a sensible substitute; every potentially 
defamatory letter they receive and then pursue with a 
Minister, would, if qualified privilege only existed, 
in the writer's opinion, place a burden on MPs to check 
each letter. 
104 de Smith, 481. 
105 Marshall, 214. 
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Kilmour observed when he was a private member he received 
300 letters a week - but an action did not seem very 
l .k l 106 1 e y. 
The concerns that arose after the Strauss decision about 
passing on defamatory letters from constituents to Ministers 
107 or quangos (these at least attract qualified 
privilege, 108 and even if a malicious constituent is 
involved members seem safe), 109 would now seem to have 
passed. 
The biggest burden, if qualified privilege existed, however, 
would be the involvement in both time and considerable 
expense of defending lawsuits by members, in which their 
qualified privilege might ultimately be upheld. 
4.2 Freedom from Arrest 
The principal reason for this privilege is expressed in a 
106 Kilmuir, 18. 
107 Donald Thompson, Letters to Ministers and Parliamentary 
Privilege. (Public Law 1959), 10. 
108 Beach v Freeson [1972) 1 QB 14 and R v Rule [1937) 2 KB 375. 
109 Meekins v Henson [1964) 1 QB 472 . 
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b H t 11 d d b 110 'f 111 d passage y a se , a opte y May, Petti er, an 
h . 112 Pac aur1: 
May, 
As it is an essential part of the constitution of 
every court of judicature, and absolutely necessary 
for the due execution of its powers, that persons 
resorting to such courts, whether as judges or as 
parties, should be entitled to certain Privileges to 
secure them from molestation during their attendance; 
it is more peculiarly essential to the Court of 
Parliament, the first and highest court in this 
kingdom, that the Members, who compose it, should not 
be prevented by trifling interruptions from their 
attendance on this important duty, but should, for a 
certain time, be excused from obeying any other call, 
not so immediately necessary for the great services 
of the nation: it has been therefore, upon these 
principles, always claimed and allowed, that the 
Members of both Houses should be, during their 
attendance in Parliament, exempted from several 
duties, and not considered as liable to some legal 
processes, to which other citizens, not intrusted 
with this most valuable franchise, are by law obliged 
to pay obedience. 11113 
97. 
Pettifer, 651. 
Pachauri, 174. 
Hatsell, ( Vol 1 ) 1-2. 
44 
l . · 1 h. h d' R b ll 4 This is an ear y pr1v1 ege w 1c accor 1ng to o ert Luce 
was at one stage more important than freedom of speech and 
certainly predates it, back to pre-Norman days. 
period before and after a session, as well as the 
The 40 days 
parliamentary session is enjoyed by the Commons. A leading 
115 case Goudy v Duncombe states the position: 
"The period of 40 days before and after the meeting of 
Parliament has, for about two centuries at least been 
considered either a convenient time or the actual time 
allowed. Such has been the usager the universally 
prevailing opinion on the subject, and such we think is 
the law. If any change is necessary or desirable, we 
are not competent to make it." 116 
Various sections of the Legislature Act 1908 specifically 
provide for the matters, namely: 
SS. 265-266 
SS. 257-264 
Provide for adjournment of civil 
proceedings; 
Provide for exemption of officers and members 
from attendance in Court as witnesses or 
parties in civil proceedings; 
114 Legislative Assemblies, 489. 
115 (1847) 1 Exch 430. 
116 Ibid, 435. 
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Relates to service of process not of a court 
of record; 
Extends these privileges to witness appearing 
before select committees; 
Preserves the right of the House to grant 
leave to attend any Court. 
Division III of the Legislature Act sections 242-269 
includes both section 242 providing the statutory basis for 
privilege and also a procedure for obtaining exemption from 
attending Court hearings. This procedure provides for an 
exemption for the duration of a session and for 10 days 
thereafter. (s. 257) 
In the writer's submission this does not conflict with the 
40 days privilege held by the Commons and consequently the 
New Zealand House of Representatives by virtue of 
section 242. Section 257 can be traced back to 1866, a year 
after the predecessor of section 242 was enacted, and whilst 
section 242 considers the consequences of inconsistency as 
at 26 September 1865 within the section, i.e. "so far as the 
same are not inconsistent with or repugnant to such 
provisions of the Constitution Act as on the 26th day of 
September 1865 (being the date of coming into operation of 
the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865) . ", later 
inconsistency is not considered. An argument for implied 
46 
repeal of the 40 day privilege could be made if there was 
any inconsistency. However, sections 257 and 259 are only 
machinery provisions and therefore no inconsistency occurs. 
Further reference to these sections can be found in 
117 McGee. 
The value of such a privilege is questionable today, 
following the Imprisonment for Debt Limitation Act 1908 
restricting imprisonment for failure to pay money except in 
rare circumstances (which requires a further Court 
h . ) 118 ear1ng . 
Freedom from arrest only extends to civil matters, but 
attempting to tell the difference between a civil and 
criminal arrest leads to grey areas, as can be demonstrated 
f 1 . 119 rom an Austra 1an case. 
On 11 April 1971 Mr Torn Uren, an M. P., was jailed for 40 
days for failing to pay $80 Court costs awarded against him 
117 McGee, 436-9. 
118 Ibid, 436-7. 
119 Commitment to Prison of Mr T. Uren, M.P. (Report of 
Committee of Privileges PP 40 (1971); and Pettifer, 651 and Odgers, 640. 
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in an unsuccessful action he brought against a constable for 
assault during a Vietnam demonstration. He was released 
after 40 hours as a 'citizen ' paid his fine. On 20 April the 
Speaker informed the House of Mr Uren's arrest and 
subsequent release . The matter of his prison commitment was 
then referred to the Committee of Privileges. The question 
for determination was whether the commitment was of a civil, 
criminal, or more criminal than civil matter. 
The committee concluded that his commitment constituted a 
breach of privilege but in view of the complexities of the 
case that the House should "best consult its own dignity by 
taking no action in regard to the breach of privilege that 
120 had occurred." 
The report was noted by the House, and the Attorney-General 
tabled correspondence from officers of the State of New 
South Wales, expressing the view that the committee's 
finding was inconsistent with views of the New South Wales 
h h .. l . 121 Courts tat t e matter was cr1m1na 1n nature. 
4.3 Jury Service 
Justification for freedom from arrest as illustrated in the 
120 Odgers, 641. 
121 1971 H.R. Deb, 526-9. 
122 
123 
124 
125 
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Hatsell question 122 is that the House has first call on its 
members; exemption from jury service and attendance as a 
witness have the same type of reasoning applied - under the 
Juries Act 1981 members are now disqualified from service on 
. 123 · I a Jury. 
The position of officers of Parliament is not clear. The 
current Juries Act 1981 does not provide an exemption for 
officers of Parliament whereas the previous Act of 1908, and 
the Juries Amendment Act 1951 which substituted a new 
section 2(1), both provided for an exemption for officers of 
Parliament< 
Clearly the intention of the 1981 Act was to consolidate the 
law relating to juries. However the writer would submit the 
privilege conferred by section 242 Legislature Act resulted 
in Parliament being able to claim priority to its officers 
and despite the inclusion or exclusion in various Juries 
Acts, this position remains. Whereas it would be illegal to 
call up a member for service, an officer of Parliament could 
rely on parliamentary privilege, if they were not exempt by 
virtue of being a barrister or solicitor with a current 
practising certificate, 124 or relying on the general power 
to excuse in the Act. 125 
Supra note 96. 
Juries Act 1981 s. 8 • 
Ibid, s. 8 ( f ) . 
Ibid, s. 15. 
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May comments that in the Juries Act 1974 (U . K. ) members and 
off i cers are persons excusable as of right as they are 
l i sted in Part III of Schedule I of that Act. However he 
states: 
4.4 
"That in view of these provisions it is unlikely that 
either House would treat the mere summoning of a member 
to serve on a jury as a breach of privilege, but this 
does not affect the right of the House to treat as 
breach of its privileges any refusal to excuse a member 
ff . f h h . d 126 or o 1cer o t e House w o 1s summone . 
Criminal Cases 
Where a member faces a criminal charge it has never 
been suggested his status is different from the 
ordinary citizen. Perhaps the unusual circumstances 
of Eliot's Case and his assault on the Soeaker might 
b . 
127 . h h d f e an exception, 1n tat at t e Lor s con erence 
in 1665, they agreed that judgment given against 
Eliot was illegal, one cause being that the assault 
on the Speaker and the utterance o f seditious words 
were dealt with by the Court of King's Bench instead 
of in Parliament. It was no t conceded that the 
assault sho ul d have been dealt with in the King's 
126 May , 108/ 9. 
127 3 St Tr 332. 
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Bench. The legal distinction between felony and misdemeanour 
· W' lk 128 P h h t led to some problems 1n R v 1 es. er aps t e mos 
interesting case involves Captain Ramsay. This case involves 
the preventive detention of a member under statutory 
authority, rather than a traditional criminal charge. The 
case occurred in 1940 when Captain Ramsay, M.P. was detained 
in Brixton prison under Reg. l8B of the Defence (General) 
Regulations 1939: 
"If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to 
believe any person to be of hostile origin or 
association or to have been recently concerned in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the 
realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts 
and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise 
control over him, he may make an order against that 
person directing that he be detained." 
A member asked the Speaker how he could raise the matter of 
Captain Ramsay's detention in July 1940, the detention 
having occurred in May and the House informed then. The 
Speaker ruled that it was too late to raise the matter as a 
question of privilege. 129 Later the House resolved by 
consensus that the Committee of Privileges report upon 
128 1763 2 Wils KB 151. 
129 H.C. deb (Vol. 363), 612. 
...I 
... I 
:1 
I 
] 
- , 
J 
. . I
J 
] 
-, 
J 
J 
] 
] 
51 
· ' d . 130 h 1 k . h. Captain Ramsay s etention. Te C er reported in is 
memorandum to the committee that no precedents existed. Two 
classes of cases with some similarity had occurred involving 
the suspensions of Habeas Corpus Acts. However, such 
suspension Acts 131 provided that "nothing in these Acts 
shall be construed to invalidate the ancient rights and 
privileges of Parliament." 
The Committee examined the Home Secretary and he 
categorically denied the detention had anything to do with 
. b h . b f 1· 132 Captain Ramsay's e aviour as a Mem er o Par iament. 
The Committee concluded: 
(1) The Home Secretary's evidence is accepted, that 
the grounds on which he acted did not arise from 
anything said by Captain Ramsay from his place in 
Parliament. If it were it would be a breach of 
. · 1 133 privi ege . 
130 H.C. deb (Vol. 363), 414-6. 
131 17 Geo 2 c 6; 45 Geo 3 c 4. 
132 H.C. 164 (1940) Evidence Q's 187-189. 
133 Ibid, para. 14. 
( 2) 
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Preventive arrest under statutory authority by 
executive order is not within the principle of 
cases to which privilege from arrest has been 
extended. 134 
The reasoning behind conclusion (2) was that in the past 
spec i fic exemption for Members of Parliament from preventive 
detention had been provided in Acts suspending normal 
rights , and no safeguard was provided here. 
The committee also reasoned that arrest for civil process 
was to en f orce a p ri va e r igh , but lack of immunity for 
criminal or executive order was done in the interest of the 
commun i ty, and to extend privilege here would be the 
creation of a new privi lege, which the House is unable to do 
(see para 2.3). 
The House agreed to the report without dividing 135 but a 
spirited debate occurred raising doubts as to the misuse of 
executive power to stifle members. 136 The writer is left 
with doubts that the use of such powers by the executive 
would meet with the same reception in a peace-time 
134 Ibid, para. 26. 
135 Ibid, paras. 4 and 26. 
136 H.C. (deb 397), 991. 
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situation, as the draconian power it places in the hands of 
executive is self apparent. 
4.5 Determining the right to sit in the House 
The provisions of the Electoral Act and the machinery of 
Election are beyond the scope of this paper. 137 There 
remains with the House, however, the power of determining 
the qualifications of members to sit if a doubt arises, e.g. 
the member refuses to take the correct oath or affirmation, 
or the member appears to be disqualified. According to 
McGee 138 both Sir George Grey and Sir Joseph Ward were the 
subject of questions being raised about their eligibility. 
4.6 Power to Suspend Members 
The power to suspend is covered by Standing Orders 139 . These 
cover breaches of order. Standing Order 196 clearly 
envisaged the concurrent power to suspend for breach of 
privilege or contempt and this occurred in 1976. 140 
137 See McGee Ch. 2 for a general discussion of the provisions 
applicable. 
138 Ibid, 440. 
139 s.o.s 193-197. 
140 1976 JHR, 267-68, 655. 
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4.7 Power to Expel Members 
141 
14 2 
143 
144 
145 
The House of Commons has the right to expel a member with 
the result that the seat becomes vacant and the ex-member 
ld k 1 · 141 MG t th t l . cou see . re-e ect1on. c ee commen s a no expu s1on 
has occurred in New Zealand. 142 With the acquisition of the 
Commons powers of 1865 he further comments, 143 "Mr Speaker 
Fitzherbert denied the power existed (to declare a seat 
vacant) . He said, "The utmost Extent to which the House can 
go, and this is very different from declaring a seat vacant, 
• 1 b f • II 144 • d 1s to expe a mem er rom its presence, 1.e. suspen • 
McGee, referring to the list of events in section 32 of the 
Electoral Act which provides for a vacancy, concludes that 
it is doubtful whether the House can expel members so as to 
vacate their seats. 145 
However, Littlejohn is of the contrary view. He says, after 
quoting various English precedents, that "as far as New 
Zealand is concerned, section 32 of the Electoral Act 1956 
sets out the various grounds on which a member's seat shall 
become vacant, including those criminal offences which have 
in former times given cause for expulsion. However, the 
ancient power to expel is available if the House should 
May, 139. 
McGee, 468. 
Ibid, 469. 
1877 Vol. 2 6, 341. 
McGee, 468. ..,. 
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ever decide to use it, and the cases listed which include a 
number prior to 1865 would provide precedents for the 
guidance of the House of Representatives of New Zealand no 
less than the House of Commons. 11146 
The Australian House of Representatives has exercised the 
power to expel a member when on 11 November 1920 Mr Mahon, 
an Opposition member, was expelled, his seat declared 
d k . 1 . h 1 14 7 h . vacant, an on seeing re-e ection e ost on t emotion 
f h . . . 148 o t e Prime Minister. May shows expulsion from the 
Commons for forgery, perjury, fraud, open rebellion, and 
corruption in the administration of justice. 149 
I B t T 1 150 d. . h d . n ar on v ay or ictum exists to suggest tat espite 
the lack of punitive powers available to colonial 
legislatures of Common law, such legislatures may have power 
to expel for aggravated or persistent misconduct, on the 
ground of necessity for self-protection of the legislature. 
In view of the existence of this dictum, the Australian 
expulsion and Littlejohn's comments, the writer firmly 
asserts that the power to expel is a power exercisable by 
the New Zealand House of Representatives. 
Littlejohn, 194. 
Pettifer, 190. 
VP (1920-21) 431-2. 
May, 139. 
(1886) 11 App Cas 197 at 205. 
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5.0 Acts Cons t ituting Breaches of Pr i vi l ege and Contempt 
The forms of contempt given in the following paragraph 
illustrate briefly what contempts have occurred. The 
material is taken mainly from McGee who in turn acknowledges 
May as a more substanti ve source . I n v i ew of the 
substant i al coverage elsewhere, only a brief synopsis is 
given below. 
5 . 1 Mi sconduct in the presence of the House or its 
Comm i t t ees 
St a nding Order 409 provides that any stranger wilfully 
or vexatiously i nterrupting the orderly conduct of the 
business of the House or of any committee shall be 
gu i lty of contempt. 
Misconduct could be in the form of physical disturbance 
or fa i lure to answer questions when a witness before 
th b f th H 1 t . 151 e ar o e ouse or a se ec committee. 
5.1 . 1 Abuse of the Right to Petition, presenting 
forged or falsified documents to the House or 
Committee 
A number of instances in the United Kingdom have 
b h ld t b . h. 15 2 een e o e contempts 1n t 1s area. No 
examples are found in New Zealand, albeit 
151 McGee, 445-6. 
152 May, 147. 
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allegations concerning the "800,000" signatures 
on the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 were made 
but no formal complaint was made. 
Deliberately misleading the House 153 
No member has been committed here but in England the 
f 154 . h h b 1 Pro umo Case 1s per aps t e est examp e. The 
House of Commons having resolved in 1963 that in 
making a personal statement which contained words he 
later admitted were not true, a former member, 
Mr Profumo, had been guilty of a grave contempt. As 
a consequence of his actions he resigned from the 
House. 155 
5.2 Attempts by improper means to influence members in their 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
1 . d 156 par 1amentary con uct 
Bribery: Acceptance or offer of a bribe would constitute 
contempt. Whilst allegations have been made in New Zealand 
no alleged receipt of a bribe has resulted in a breach of 
privilege case in New Zealand. 
Attempted intimidation: McGee 157 draws the distinction 
between effective lobbying and intimidating behaviour. A 
recent case occurred in 19 8 5 when the Privileges Committee 
Pettifer, 654, McGee 447-48. 
May, 149. 
Pettifer, 654. 
McGee, 451. 
Ibid. 
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reported back on 12 December regarding the Truth Case. When 
the Editor and reporter concerned of Truth were formally 
reprimanded (having paid out of court settlements to the 
members concerned for alleged defamation) for printing a 
story concerning threats reprinted from 'Out', an 
'alternative' Gay magazine, and somewhat embellished in 
Truth, over 3 MPs' behaviour on the Homosexual Law Reform 
Billf this reporting and embellishment was held to be an 
attempt to influence members in their parliamentary 
behaviour. 
The classic Australian case of the Bankstown Observer 
(Brown/Fitzpatrick Case) 158 where articles were published 
which tended to influence and intimidate a member, is dealt 
with under section 7.6 below. 
5.3 Speeches or writing reflecting on the House 
An example of these types of contempt occurred in 1982 over 
the Heffernan/NZ Times report on pairing. 159 A Social 
Credit (as it then was) research officer criticised 
somewhat inaccurately the pairing procedure of the House. 
Although only an apology was required, the point was made 
by the committee that Parliament must safeguard its 
privileges and not let instances merely pass by. 
158 J.A. Pettifer. The Case of the Bankstown Observer'. (The 
Table XXIV 1955), 83-92. 
159 1982, AJHR (Vol. VII), I.6, 8. 
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5.4 Off . 160 d . 161 1cers an Witnesses 
Officers of the House and witnesses appearing before 
the House or committees of the House, enjoy similar 
privileges to those of members in relation to arrest 
and obstruction • 
6.0 Procedural aspects 
The House of Commons reviewed the Law of Parliamentary 
Privilege in 1966-67 and 1976-77; the Standing Orders of 
the New Zealand Parliament were amended in 1979 reflecting 
some of the British experience. The 1966 Select Committee 
being the major review will be considered first. 
The Committee was set up 'to review the Law of Parliamentary 
Privilege as it affects this House, and the procedures by 
which cases of privilege are raised and dealt with in this 
House, and to report whether any changes in the Law of 
Privilege or Practice of the House are desirable.•
162 
160 McGee, 454. 
161 Ibid, 454-5. 
162 The Table, (Vol. XXXVII, 1968) 16. 
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The committee comprised Samuel Silkin, Q.C. (later an 
Attorney-General), Quintin Hogg (later Lord Chancellor), 
Mr Michael Foot, and Mr George Strauss, as well as several 
. d ' 11 163 f other Privy Councillors. Accor 1ng to A en a summary o 
the criticisms of privilege it found is: 
(a) the penal jurisdiction was too readily invoked; 
(b) the procedure failed to accord with the principles of 
natural justice; 
(c) the scope of the jurisdiction was too wide and 
uncertain; 
(d) the defences available to accused persons were likewise 
uncertain. 
These are fairly substantial criticisms and some of them 
controversial. Perhaps therefore it is not surprising that 
no immediate action was taken to remedy defects. 
The complete list of recommendations appears as Appendix 1 
to this paper. 
163 F.G. Allen, Privilege at Westminster 1978 (Table XLVI, 1978) 
52-55, hereafter Allen. 
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The committee received representations from a number of 
quarters, including the Study of Parliament Group, the Law 
Society, Bar Council, and Broadcasting Authority, as well as 
memoranda from the Clerk, and the Clerk of the Privileges 
Committee. The committee met 24 times and reported back in 
December 1967. 164 There followed a significant gap. Early in 
1969 the Leader of the House proposed motions to put into 
effect the less controversial recommendations; however even 
these were finally withdrawn and a motion to note the 
contents proposed and agreed. A further debate occurred in 
1971, but again the principal proposals were withdrawn. A 
recommendation that was implemented and is of some practical 
significance was to rescind an obsolete resolution that 
165 
publication of debates was a contempt (e.g. Hansard). The 
matter then rested until in January 1977 the recommendations 
of the 1967 committee was referred to another Committee of 
Privileges for its consideration. 
164 Sam Silkin, QC. The Select Committee on Parliamentary 
Privileges in the United Kingdom, (The Parliamentarian, Vol. 
51, Jan 1970), 1 hereafter Silkin. 
165 Allen, 53. 
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6.1 1966-67 Committee 
Looking at the four major heads of criticism above, in 
respect of penal jurisdiction, the committee recommended: 166 
(1) In the future exercise of penal jurisdiction the 
House should follow the general rule that it 
should be exercised: 
(a) in any event as sparingly as possible, and 
(b) only when the House is satisfied that to 
exercise it is essential in order to provide 
reasonable protection for the House its 
members or officers from any obstruction, or 
attempt at or threat of obstruction as is 
causing or likely to cause, substantial 
interference with the performance of their 
respective functions. 
166 HC 34 (1967-68) Summary of recommendations XLIX-LI. 
J 
J 
1 
J 
J 
1 
63 
( 2 ) In the ordinary case where a Member has a remedy 
in the Courts he should not be permitted to 
invoke the penal jurisdiction of the House in lieu 
of that remedy. (The House however should retain 
the ultimate power to punish in public interest 
cases.) 
The submission of the Study of Parliament Group that 
. . d' . b f d h 167 Juris 1ct1on e trans erre tote Courts was not 
accepted. The main argument was that it was a denial of 
natural justice for the House to hear complaints against 
itself, particularly without allowing legal representation 
for the accused. 
However, the committee concluded that the complaints were 
more theoretical than practical. In two centuries two 
strangers had been admonished at the Bar, two newspaper 
editors reprimanded, no fines imposed, and no one imprisoned 
since 1880, except overnight for disorderly conduct in the 
11 · 'lk' 168 'f h . . d . ga er1es. S1 1n comments 1 t e House 1s a JU ge 1n 
its own cause it is a lenient and merciful one. 
167 Ibid, Appendix V, 192-5. 
168 Silkin, 415. 
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Members were confident that the reserve r ight to imprison 
was necessary, in the event of, say , an unjustified press 
attack, even if criticism was the lifeblood of democracy. 
The power to imprison should, they felt, be supplemented by 
the power to fine, and should not be transferred to the 
Cou r t's j urisdiction as sometimes the balance between 
freedom of the i ndividual and the protection of the House 
i nvol ved political considerations which might prove an 
embarrassment for Judges to consider. Any appellate 
function could be seen to be performed by the House itself 
considering i ts committee report. 
The first r ecommendation of the committee was to abolish the 
use of the term 'parliamentary privilege' and speak of 
'rights and i mmunities' and to rename the committee 'the 
Select Committee of House of Commons Rights' • 169 The logic 
here appeared t o be of the use of language and connotations 
of some sort of privileged class. The only comment I feel 
h . . 170 tat 1s necessary 1s aptly expressed by Marshall, "One 
might as well stop talking about select committees on the 
ground that they sound intolerably exclusive." 
169 Summary of recommendations, xlix. 
170 Marshall, 241. 
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The fifth principal recommendation was that it should be 
open to the House in deciding whether a contempt had been 
committed, whether the accused had "justification" available 
as a defence. 
The Clerk had stated that justification had never definitely 
been decided upon as a defence by the House. 171 The 
committee had power to look at surrounding facts and 
circumstances. The Attorney-General felt in principle the 
defence should be allowed. 
Mr Abraham 172 in his memo suggested that all precedents 
indicated, particularly in libel cases, that truth was no 
defence, just as in the criminal law. One wonders, however, 
how truth could be classed as a breach of privilege, even if 
in the particular circumstances it can clearly hurt. 
Recommendation 6 was to clarify the scope of the legal 
defence of absolute and qualified privilege by legislation. 
(i.e., What is meant by "Proceedings in Parliament''.) (See 
1977 report infra.) 
171 HC 34 (1967-68) p 5. 
172 Ibid, Appendix XIII. 
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Recommendation 23 was to legislate for the power to impose 
fixed periods of imprisonment, fines, and to remi , suspend 
or vary them. 
The procedural changes recommended were to depart from the 
procedures currently used by all select committees and not 
to make complaints in public, but to direct them initially 
to the Clerk of Committee of Privileges, and not to make 
them, as previously, at the earliest opportunity, but as 
soon as practicable. The Clerk of the Committee would bring 
any complaint before the committee which would decide 
whether it warranted investigation. As a safeguard 50 MPs 
could by motion require that the House do decide that the 
committee investigate. 
6.2 1977 Report 
The Committee of. Privileges as mentioned had the 1966-67 
report referred to it and it reported in June 1977. 173 They 
comment on page (iii) of the report that the principal 
recommendations not adopted from the 1967 recommendations 
are: 
(A) The scope of privilege: What acts should be treated as 
contempts and what matters should be absolutely 
privileged. 
173 HC 417 ( 1976-77). 
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(B) How complaints are raised in the House. 
(C) Whether the penalties the House may impose are 
appropriate to current circumstances. 
h d h f 11 . d . 174 T ey ma et e o owing recommen at1ons: 
(a) •• and in deciding whether to give a complaint 
67 
precedence over the orders of the day Mr Speaker should 
be entitled to take into account this general statement 
and the reports of the Committee of Privileges in 
analogous cases. 
(b) The existence of a remedy at law should not exclude a 
complaint, but Mr Speaker could take it into account. 
(Contra 1967 report.) 
(c) The mode and extent of publication of an alleged 
complaint should be able to be taken into account in 
considering complaints. 
174 Ibid, Summary of Conclusions (x). 
(d) "Proceedings in Parliament" should be defined by 
statute for the purpose of absolute privilege in 
defamation caseso 
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(e) Complaints should be raised in the following manner: 
(1) Member to notify Mr Speaker of complaint in 
writing as soon as practicable. 
(2) If Mr Speaker satisfied it should take precedence 
over other parliamentary business, he announces 
this decision and member can move a motion 
(normally to refer to Committee of Privileges). 
( 3 ) If Mr Speaker not satisfied a matter needs 
precedence then he will inform the member, who 
cannot then raise the matter with precedence in 
the Chamber. (The Member would have the right to 
table a notice of motion.) 
(f) The power to fine should be revived by statute and the 
power to imprison should be abolished (latter 
recommendation contra 1966 report). 
J 
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(g) Miscellany 
(1) Recommendation 5 1967 - On justification adopted 
( 2) II 
( 3 ) II 
( 4 ) II 
7 1967 - Abolish immunity from 
civil arrest 
22 1967 - Legal aid to be adopted 
1 1967 - Change term "parliamentary 
privilege" not recommended 
6.2.1 Comments on Recommendations 
The House approved the 1977 report on February 6, 
1978. No legislation to abolish imprisonment or 
reintroduce fines or define 'oroceedings in 
Parliament' has been introduced. However, 
substantial changes have occurred as a result of 
the other recommendations. 
The new procedure for dealing with complaints is 
now as recommended by the 1977 Committee. This 
should reduce the number of complaints and remove 
trivial ones from consideration, one of the main 
70 
concerns of the review. The content and mode of 
the alleged contempt are now open for 
consideration as are the availability of other 
remedies in the case of libel,
175 and Mr Speaker 
can take into account previous privilege committee 
reports. 
Despite the Government in 1978 agreeing to 
introduce regulations on penalties this has not 
occurred. The recommendation that sparing use of 
the penal power be made is now the practice of the 
House. The power to fine would still seem to be 
unavailable. (See section 8 infra.) Both 
committees recommended defining 'Proceedings in 
Parliament'~ however, this has not to date 
occurred. 
6.3 Procedure in New Zealand 
The Standing Orders of the New Zealand Parliament were 
amended in 1979 after consideration of the House of Commons 
changes. The Standing Orders Committee reported on 
privilege: 
175 Practice and Procedure, UK Raising Privilege Complaints, 
(The Parliamentarian 1978), 140. 
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"In the light of criticism that the privilege 
jurisdiction has been used too readily for trivial 
matters, the Committee examined the recently adopted 
procedures of the House of Commons •. 
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"The Committee considers it would be preferable for the 
matter to be considered outside the House, in the 
privacy of the Speaker's office 
It also suggested that Mr Speaker should determine whether a 
breach of privilege is involved rather than the present rule 
whether prima facie a breach is made out. 177 No changes to 
the procedure whereby matters of privilege are heard by the 
Committee were proposed, but as far as possible those 
members deliberating on the matter of privilege should be 
those who heard the evidence. 178 New Standing Orders were 
then adopted, and appear as Appendix 2 which were 
subsequently amended in 1985; these appear in Appendix 3. 
These changes were described by the Standing Orders 
Committee report 179 in the following paragraphs: 
176 Report of Standing Orders Committee 1979. (Appendices to 
Journals Val IX 1979), I.14. 
177 C.P. Littlejohn. New Privilege rules in New Zealand. (The 
Table Vol. XLIX 1981), 42. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Report of the Standing Orders Committee 1985 I.14. 
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~3. 6.7 Matte r s o f Privilege 
3. 6 .7.le The commi ttee examined the rules brought 
i nto force in 1979, and cons i ders that while 
they have been reasonably sat i sfactory in 
pract i ce there are several ways in which the 
practice c ould be brought i nto line with 
othe r r ecommendations or provide for matters 
not at present covered. 
First, the committee recommends the inclusion 
o f a provision that in the event of strangers 
who are present conducting themselves in a 
manner that may affect the privileges of the 
House, the matter may be raised forthwith . 
Second l y, the comments of the Privileges 
Committee i n its report of 17 December 1982 
concerning minor privilege matters have been 
noted. A standing order is now proposed to 
g i ve effect to the view of that committee, 
formall y raising the threshold for acceptance 
of a matter as involving a question of 
J 
.. 
J 
.. 
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privilege. Thirdly, a new standing order is 
proposed providing that where a member of the 
House is involved in a complaint of 
privilege, the member shall be informed, 
first by the member raising the matter, and 
secondly by the Speaker before the Speaker 
presents a report on the matter to the House. 
Fourthly, provision is made for a matter of 
privilege to stand referred to the Privileges 
Commit tee when reported to the Hous.e by the 
Speaker. It will no longer be necessary for 
the Leader of the House to move a motion and 
consequently no debate will take place at 
this stage. Fifthly, the precedence to be 
given to a report from the Privileges 
Committeee is more accurately stated." 
A major review is likely this year (1986). 
6.3.1 Raising a matter of Privilege 
From the observations of the 1979 committee above, it 
can be seen that the requirement of written notice in 
s.o. 427, now S.O. 400, is a filter to remove trivial 
complaints. 
74 
In summary the procedure is~ 
(1) At the earliest opportunity a member raises a 
complaint to the Speaker in writing, provided that 
complaints relating to strangers being present can 
be raised forthwith.
180 
(2) The Speaker considers the allegation and 
determines whether a question of privilege is 
involved. In considering the matter, the 
importance of the matter is taken into account, 
and if trivial or technical the allegation will be 
1 d .
 f . ·1 181 rue as not a question o pr1v1 ege. 
(3) If the Speaker finds a question of privilege is 
involved, he reports this at the first opportunity 
to the House, and the matter stands referred 
immediately, without the necessity for a 
resolution, to the Privileges Committee. Provided 
that if another member of the House is involved 
that member is advised of the Speaker's intention 
prior to reporting it to the House. In the event 
of the Speaker ruling no question of privilege is 
180 s.o. 400. 
181 S.O.s 401 and 402. 
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involved, no precedence is accorded the matter. 182 
(4) A report back of a Privileges Committee has 
precedence over other business, and speeches of 
members are limited to 10 minutes. 183 
(5) It is a technical requirement that any member 
basing a complaint on documentary evidence shall 
produce a copy and be prepared to name the printer 
or publisher. 
A test of the then new 1979 provisions occurred in 1980 
with a matter raised by the Leader of the Opposition, 
Rt. Hon Mr Rowling, against the Rt Hon. Mr MacIntyre on 
the marginal loans affair. Rowling's letter to the 
Speaker claimed that evidence given on oath to the 
Commission of Inquiry, that had been set up to inquire 
into the affair showed that the Minister Mr MacIntyre 
had in a June 26 statement either: 
(a) made a deliberately misleading statement to the 
House, or 
(b) misled the House. 
182 S.O.s 402 and 403. 
183 s.o. 404. 
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k d . . l . h 
184 d . h . 
The Spea er , accor 1ng to Litt eJo n, state 1n 1s 
reply that no question of privilege arose o After 
further submissions from Rowling and the Deputy 
Opposition Leader Mr Lange (as he then was), the 
Speaker reviewed his decision and gave a considered 
ruling, the matter being referred to the Committee of 
Privileges. Significant general points of the ruling 
185 are~ 
(a) If no question of privilege is involved, since 
this finalises the matter as one of precedence, 
Mr Speaker should advise the complainant. 
(b) If a question of privilege is found, and it 
concerns another memb~r, the member should be 
informed prior to the report to the House (now 
incorporated in s.o. 402). 
(c) In the event that a ruling is to be made, the 
Leader of the House who moves the motion of 
referral to the Privileges Committee should be 
advised. (Now it is automatically referred 
without any motion s.o. 402(2) .) 
184 C.P. Littlejohn. New Privilege Rules in New Zealand (Table 
1981), 43. 
185 A. von Tunzelmann. Privilege Complaints - Procedural 
Developments in the New Zealand Parliament - (Paper 
presented to Regional Speakers and Clerks Conference, 
Brisbane 1984), hereafter von Tunzelmann. 
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6.3.2 Procedure of Privileges Committee 
The Standing Orders require that once the Speaker has 
ruled that a question of privilege is involved, the matter 
is automatically referred to the committee. 186 
The only precedural proposal relating to the committee 
made by the 1979 Standing Orders Committee was that the 
same members deliberate as heard the evidence. von 
Tunzelmann comments that since 1979 the committee has 
practised this and taken pains to ensure its procedures 
accord with the rules of natural justice. 187 The 
seniority of the committee is reflected by its membership, 
which usually consists of the Attorney-General as 
Chairman, the Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister 
(or senior Cabinet Minister if he is the 
Attorney-General), and the Opposi~ion members are usually 
the Leader and Deputy Leader. The committee has adopted 
certain standard practices which are: 
(1) The committee meets as soon as possible to formulate a 
charge; and 
(2) to determine which witnesses will be required; and 
(3) to direct the Clerk to advise the parties of their 
requirement to attend and their ability to present 
written submissions, and their opportunity of being 
represented by Counsel; 
186 s.o. 403. 
187 von Tunzelmann, 5. 
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(4) During a hearing witnesses will if necessary be 
heard on oath, and will be examined by committee 
members. Counsel may be permitted to 
cross - examine ; 
(5) After the hearing, the same committee members will 
deliberate and report findings back to the House. 
This will include recommending an appropriate 
penalty should a breach of privilege be found. 
The 1980 case of Macintyre
188 is illustrative of these 
practices, the committee having found no precedents 
determined its procedures at length and stated in its 
report: 
"The committee has attempted to conduct the 
inquiry as fairly as possible, and in accordance 
with normal judicial principles.
11189 
Counsel was permitted to represent Mr MacIntyre and on 
this occasion to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 
Littlejohn comments that the conduct of the proceedings 
followed more closely than had usually been the case, 
. d. . 1 . . 1 190 JU 1c1a pr1nc1p es. 
188 Supra para 6.3.1. 
189 AJHR (1980) Vol V. (I.6), 5. 
190 C.P. Littlejohn. New Privilege Rules in New Zealand, (Table 
1981), 45. 
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6.3.3 Standard of Proof 
This particular question was also addressed and on 
examining the precedents no recognised procedure was 
found. 191 The committee decided to adopt a civil standard 
'on the balance of probabilities' but requiring proof of 
'a very high order having regard to the very serious 
nature of the allegations'. In a 1982 case the committee 
hearing a complaint against the Hon. Mr Tizard, M.P. 
regarding an allegation of an untruth in Hansard, found 
that no breach occurred as the evidence presented did not 
reach the required standard of proof. 192 
6.3.4 Formulation of the charge 
Whilst the committee normally meets as soon as possible to 
formulate a charge, the committee took the view in 1982, 
that once a general matter is referred to it by the 
Speaker it could formulate specific charges (if any). It 
is not limited in its inquiries to the matters referred by 
the Speaker but has a general requirement to determine 
whether or not a contempt of the House or breach of its 
privileges 
191 von Tunzelmann, 6. 
192 AJHR (1981) (Vol V I.6) 3. 
80 
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has occurred. Consequently a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the committee by counsel that the committee 
lacked power to deal with the matters set out in the charge 
failed. This must be correct as courts would generally be 
able to amend charges, whereas here the nature of framing a 
charge poses difficulties. A power to look generally at 
breaches or contempt is the very purpose of the committee 
and it cannot be expected to know all the details prior to 
investigating them o 
The combined report of two 1982 cases involving select 
committee proceedings had the committee expressing concern 
at having to deal with matters of "insufficient 
substance 11 • 194 This matter has been dealt with in the 1985 
revision allowing the Speaker to consider the "degree of 
importance of the matter . and shall not determine that 
a question of privilege is involved if the matter is 
technical or trivial and does not warrant the further 
attention of the House. 11195 
193 AJHR (1982) (Vol. VII I.6), 8. 
194 Ibid, 17 and 18. 
195 s.o. 401. 
• 
• 
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6.3.5 Open hearings 
Hearings are traditionally private although in 1975 
and 1982, cases were heard publicly, and in 1985 
hearings of the Committee on the ' Foley Case were 
conducted in public, 196 whereas the N.Z. Truth case 
h . 197 Th . . d . ear1ngs were not. e maJor cons1 erat1ons are 
the principle of open hearings and "justice" being 
seen to be done against the practical constraints 
of space, noise, etc. However, practical 
constraints are encountered by Courts daily, and 
realistically the principle of open hearings is 
what needs addressing. The change in standing 
orders in 1985 may result in a change of approach 
h . h . ht 1 . h . 198 w 1c m1g resu t 1n more open ear1ngs. 
7.0 Conflict with the Courts 
Some of the cases involving conflict were discussed 
earlier in paras 2.1 and 2.2 above, in particular R v 
Paty, Stockdale v Hansard, The Sheriff of Middlesex and 
Ashby v Whyte. 199 The dualism arising from these 
decisions was briefly mentioned on pag es 8, 9, 14, and 35 
supra. 
196 AJHR (1985), I 6A, 3. 
197 Ibid, 7. 
198 s.o. 328. 
199 Supra notes 29-33. 
It is perhaps inevitable and even desirable that some 
conflict between various parts of a constitutional system 
should develop, as the parameters for each can then be set. 
Palmer comments~ 
"That the English Constitution can tolerate the doubts 
and difficul ies arising from two doctrines of 
privilege, one emanating from the Courts and the other 
from Parliament, may seem strange to those who believe 
in judicial supremacy. But it is beyond question that 
l' t d "200 oes. 
To some extent the conflict arises over the ultimate 
sanction that is available to Parliament - punishment and, 
in particular, the power to imprison. Another aspect is the 
exclusive right of Parliament to control its own 
proceedings. From these two standpoints I will approach the 
problem. 
7.1 Burdett v Abbott and associated cases 
Burdett v Abbott 201 is a good starting point. Lord 
Ellenborough, C.J. said, " . the right of self protection 
implies as a consequence a right to use the necessary means 
200 Palmer, 753. 
201 14 East 1. 
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for self protection, 202 and later, "indeed that they would 
sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it" [i.e. 
The power to punish]. In other words Courts have recognised 
punishment as a necessity, and as early as 1415 a Royal 
Serjeant-at-Arms was appointed to attend Parliament who had 
the distinction of being able to arrest without warrant, a 
considerable power set in its historical context. 
The Commons grew to have the power to take persons into 
custody by the Serjeant-at-Arms, either to require their 
attendance or to punish. We have seen the highpoint . of this 
' 11· h 'ff d 203 d h 204 1n compe 1ng s er1 s to atten , an Jay v Top am 
where two King's Bench Judges were imprisoned. 
The conflict then arises because any persons deprived of 
their liberty have the right to have such deprivation 
examined by the High Court by means of habeas corpus, and/or 
depending on the circumstances may have a claim in tort for 
wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and assault. These 
Court proceedings will undoubtedly cause the High Court to 
come face to face with the power to commit by the House, 
hence the conflict. 
202 Ibid, 137. 
203 The Case of Sheriff of Middlesex, supra note 32. 
204 12 State Trials 821 and supra note 25. 
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The first important case to come before the King's Bench on 
a writ of habeas corpus was that of the Earl of 
h f b 205 . 1677 h ' . l . 1 · d s a ts ury 1n o He was, as 1s tit e 1mp 1e , a 
member of the Lords. (There is no substantial difference 
between their privileges and the Commons except they could 
commit indefinitely notwithstanding the House being 
d i ssolved.) He was ordered to be committed to the Tower by 
the Lords for "High Contempt against this House"o No facts 
were mentioned in the warrant. 
The arguments for his release on habeas corpus proceedings 
were: 
1. "High contempt" was too vague. 
2. The return did not show where the offence was 
committed. It must therefore be presumed to have been 
outside Parliament. 
3. The time of the offence is uncertain. 
4. It does not show if commitment is an accusation or 
conviction. 
This line of argument would clearly be enough to release 
anyone from anywhere in ordinary circumstances. 
205 1 Mod Rep 144; Pachauri, 250. 
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But Rainsford C.J. said, "This Court has no jurisdiction" 206 
and Wylde said, "The return no doubt is illegal but the 
question is one of jurisdiction. • This Court cannot 
intermeddle with the transactions of the High Courts of 
Peers in Parliament." 
Appealing the case to the House of Lords would undoubtedly 
have brought the same conclusion, and placed new emphasis on 
being tried by one's peers. R v Paty, discussed earlier at 
para 2.2, confirmed this case and left the conclusion that a 
Court will not examine a warrant of either House expressed 
in general terms. That is, provided no reasons are given 
Parliament can commit to prison anyone, and no one other 
than themselves can release them. 
Taking this one step further, in Brass Crosby's case 207 , the 
Lord Mayor of London was committed to the Tower of London by 
order of the Commons. A writ of habeas corpus was sent 
directly to the Lieutenant of the Tower, in reply to which 
the Speaker's warrant was produced, and the warrant this 
time gave reasons for committal. In theory therefore this 
should have been reviewable by the Courts, on the precedents 
206 Ibid, 145-6. 
207 2 Wils K.B. 188. 
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established. It did not happen. In a unanimous decision the 
Court refused to review the matter, Blackstone, J. saying, 
"the power to commit results from first principles of 
justice, for if they have power to decide then they have 
power to punish, no other Court shall scan the judgement of 
• h ' • 1 f ' • 11 2 0 8 a superior court, or t e pr1nc1pa seat o Justice. 
However, in Burdett v Abbott 209 the Court changed direction. 
In 1811 Burdett, a member of the House, was committed to the 
Tower on a Speaker's warrant, for a libel on the House. 
The King's Bench decision is of note. Lord Ellenborough, 
C.J. raised 3 points: 
(1) Whether the Commons had power to commit for contempt; 
(2) If they did, did the warrant in this instance disclose 
sufficient grounds for committal, 
(3) Whether the execution of the Speaker's warrant was in 
law justifiable. 210 
208 Ibid, 204-5. 
209 14 East 1. 
210 Ibid, 134. 
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To point (1), he traced the history of privilege and 
concluded that the power to punish existed on grounds of 
necessity irrespective of any other. 
On point (2), the warrant was sufficient unless it disclosed 
grounds that were 'unjustifiable'. 
On point (3), on contempt proceedings doors could be broken 
down by officers to execute warrants if necessary. 
However, if the commitment was for general purposes it was 
not capable of further inquiry, but if it committed for 
something that appeared unjust and contrary to natural 
justice then the Court must look at it and act as justice 
required. 
The decision was taken both to the Court of Exchequer 
211 Chamber and the House of Lords on a writ of error, and 
judgement affirmed in the House of Lords without even 
hearing defence argument. 
This then determined the ri g ht of the House to commit but if 
it did so other than in general terms, the matter was 
reviewable in the Law Courts. 
211 5 Dow 165; 14 East 199. 
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The practice of the House has been to issue general warrants 
not specifying the nature, time or place of the contempt.
212 
Pauchari goes on to suggest that despite the practice to 
issue general warrants, it appears from certain observations 
of courts of law, that even if a contempt or breach of 
privilege which has taken place in the precincts of the 
House, or in view of the House, is specified in the warrant, 
the courts would [still] not be prepared to go into the 
question of whether the Act constituting a contempt or 
breach of privilege, had amounted to a known breach or 
213 
contempt of the House. 
In Stockdale v Hansard all four Judges conceded that the 
decisions of the House about events or happenings in the 
precincts or in the course of proceedings must go 
unquestioned in a court of law. 214 
7.2 John Wilkes 
The two cases involving internal procedure which are of 
great historical and constitutional importance are R v 
Wilkes 215 and Bradlaugh v Gossett. 216 Palmer writing in the 
212 Pachauri, 260. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Denham, C.J., Littledale J, Patterson J, and Coleridge J. at 
114, 162, 209, and 233 respectively of 9 A & E 1. 
215 19 How. St. Tr 982 (1763). 
216 (1884) 12 QBD 271. 
89 
Iowa Law Review 217 compares Wilkes with the American case of 
Adam Clayton Powell. Whilst the American comparison is not 
strictly relevant on this point, his notes on Wilkes are, 
and are referred to extensively hereafter. 
Palmer setting the scene says, 
"For those whose English history is rusty ••. the 
contributions made by John Wilkes to the idea of 
political freedom and constitutional history. [he 
is] the last great political figure in whose exploits 
both sides delight and in whose achievements on behalf 
of political liberty both take pride." 218 
He first came to attention over the question of general 
warrants. He was arrested by two of the King's messengers 
under a general warrant for seditious libel and detained by 
them in the House. The charge arose out of a magazine 
article in his journal "The North Briton'' in which he 
criticised the King's policies. The Court of Common Pleas 
had no hesitation in releasing him on a writ of habeas 
corpus, as he was entitled to parliamentary privilege as a 
member from arrest. 
The King, George III, was none too pleased, and having the 
parliamentary numbers had Parliament resolve (against their 
prior precedents) that: 
217 Palmer, 725-71. 
218 Ibid, 729. 
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"That privilege of Parliament does not extend to the 
case of writing and publishing seditious libels, nor 
ought to be allowed to obstruct the ordinary Courts of 
Law in the speedy and effectual prosecution of so 
heinous and dangerous offencea"
219 
Wilkes was ordered to attend Parliament, but was wounded in 
a duel and fled to Paris.
220 
Some eight years later in 1771, Wilkes published accounts of 
parliamentary debates, which then were usually disguised for 
fear of breach of privilege. His publications were 
undisguised. The printers were ordered to appear at the 
bar. Wilkes was then an alderman and magistrate of the City 
of London. Using his judicial role he cast doubts as to the 
legality of the House's action, and permitted an action to 
commence against officers of the House. The Mayor and 
another alderman were brought before the House and committed 
to the Tower. Popular support was so great in favour of 
'lk h h C d'd d d · h' 
221 
W1 est at t e ommons 1 not are procee against 1m. 
From that date, whilst technically a breach, publication of 
debates could be done with impunity.
222 
After Wilkes's departure for Paris in 1764 he was expelled 
from the Commons. Following the dissolution of 1768 he 
219 LY (1760-64) 426; May, 110. 
220 Palmer, 731. 
221 Ibid, 732. 
222 Ibid. 
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returned and was elected Member of Parliament for Middlesex. 
The original charges of sedition were pursued and he was 
sentenced to 22 months' imprisonment, and could not take his 
seat. He confessed to writing another libel suggesting one 
of the Judges and the Solicitor-General had bribed a witness 
h . . 1 d . 11 d 223 at 1s tr1a , an was again expe e . 
However, his electors re-elected him, the House resolved he 
was incapable of re-election, and declared it void. May 
d . . d 224 11 h says a new expe 1ent was tr1e ; a Mr Luttre , ten an 
M.P., resigned his seat (by taking the Chiltern Hundreds) 
and stood against Wilkes; he was defeated by 296 to Wilkes's 
1143, 225 but petitioned the House against the return of 
Wilkes. 
The Middlesex electors' counter petition had no effect; the 
House declared Luttrell duly elected. 226 A further 12 years 
lapsed and in 1774 Wilkes was again elected and this time 
permitted to take his seat. The injustice done to him was 
the subject of resolutions in 1774, 1776, 1777, 1779, and 
1781, and finally in 1782 he succeeded, in that the 
resolution of 1769, that Wilkes "was and is incapable of 
being elected a Member to Serve in this p resent Parliament", 
223 32 H.C. Jour 178 (Feb 3 1769). 
224 May, 141. 
225 Palmer, 749. 
226 32 H.C. Jour 178 at 387. 
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was expunged from the Journals as being "subversive of the 
rights of the Whole Body of Electors of this Kingdom.
11227 
The major purpose in relating these facts is that at no 
time did Wilkes attempt to obtain justice in the Law Courts. 
Despite his record for being litigiously inclined, he did 
not even seem to contemplate that such a remedy was 
available. The pressure he brought was political and 
ultimately successful. 
This could be compared with the 1980 case of Wybrow
228 where 
provisions of the Electoral Act 1956 were considered. In 
particular sl68 provides that the decision of the High Court 
relating to election petitions "shall be final and 
conclusive and without appeal and shall not be questioned in 
any way". 
The Act is concerned with consolidating and amending 
enactments relating to the election of Members of the House 
of Representatives, and in my submission in no way has any 
effect on "proceedings in parliament" after the election is 
1 C . 1 h . h 1 b 229 . compete. erta1n y t e rig t to expe a mem er 1s not 
affected. 
227 38 H.C. Jour 977. 
228 Wybrow v Chief Electoral Officer [1980] 1 NZLR 147. 
229 Supra para. 4.7. 
I 
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However, it would seem unlikely that the House attempting to 
declare another candidate elected would escape an attempt to 
challenge this in view of the Electoral Act provisions. 
This would presumably be an attempt by the House to create a 
new privilege and would doubtless lead to conflict if a 
Court took the view that despite Article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights it had statutory power under the Electoral Act. 
The remedy today as in John Wilkes's day would again lie in 
the political and not judicial arena. 
7.3 Charles Bradlaugh 
Charles Bradlaugh on the other hand raised the question 
clearly in the Courts. In Bradlaugh v Gossett 230 the 
Queen's Bench had to determine if actions inside the House 
could be questioned, and if so, by the Courts. Bradlaugh is 
d "b d b 231 . . f escri e y Heuston as a prominent representative o 
that forgotten class, the Victorian free-thinker. He was 
elected to Parliament from the Northampton Constituency on a 
number of occasions. Under the Parliamentary Oaths Act 
1855, he was required to take an oath to be able to sit. In 
1880 he claimed to make affirmation under the Evidence 
Amendment Acts of 1869 and 1870 instead, as he was an 
2 3 0 ( 18 8 4) 12 QB D, 2 71. 
231 Heuston, 72. 
atheist . He was eventually permitted to take h i s seat 
"subject t o li abil ity by statute. 232 
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The House of Lords in an appeal on an action for 
penalties 233 decided that by making an aff i rmat i on instead 
of taking the oath he had not become qualified to take his 
seat. 
He was re-elected and again attempted to take the oath in a 
different form . The House ordered that he should not be 
permitted to disturb the proceedings of the House and 
ordered the Serjeant - at - Arms, Gossett, not to let him enter, 
using force if necessary. 
Bradlaugh commenced proceedings claiming in a declaration 
that the order of the House was beyond its competence, and 
therefore, void, and sought an order restraining the 
Serjeant-at-Arms from preventing his entry. 
The Queen's Bench Division accepted neither plea. It 
concluded that what was complained of was "requlation of its 
own proceedings within its own walls". 
Parliament's interpretation of statutes was not open to 
scrutiny in the courts, and if it ordered its officers to 
232 May, 90. 
233 Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271. 
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carry out duties by force if necessary, the courts would not 
prevent them.
234 The judgement given by Stephen, J. is 
particularly noteworthy. He defines the relationship of 
Court and Parliament: 
"There is another proposition equally true, equally 
well established, which seems to me decisive of the 
case before us. What is said or done within the walls 
of parliament cannot be enquired into in a court of 
law. On this point all the judges in the two great 
cases which exhaust the learning on the subject, -
Burdett v. Abbott and Stockdale v. Hansard - are agreed 
and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the Houses over 
their own members, their right to impose discipline 
within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use 
the words of Lord Ellenborough, 'They would sink into 
utter contempt and inefficiency without it'. 
"I need not discuss at any length the fact that the 
defendant in this case is the Serjeant-at-Arms. The 
Houses of Parliament cannot act by themselves in a 
body; they must act by officers; and the 
Serjeant-at-Arms is the legal and recognised officer of 
234 Ibid, 278; May, 90; Pachauri, 56-58 . 
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the House of Commons to execute its orders o I 
entertain no doubt that the House had a right to decide 
on the subject- matter, have decided it, and have 
ordered their officer to give effect to their decision. 
He is protected by their decision •• 235 
" • • I do not say that the resolution of the House is 
the judgment of a Court not subject to our revision~ 
but it has much in common with such a judgment. The 
House of Commons is not a Court of Justice~ but the 
effect of its privilege to regulate its own internal 
concerns practically invests it with a judicial 
character when it has to apply to particular cases the 
provisions of Acts of Parliament. 236 
Stephen, J. here is very emphatic that rights to be 
exercised in the House such as voting and sitting only the 
House could consider, whereas rights to be exercised out of 
and independently of the House also exist, but the case in 
point was not one of these. 
This case was followed 50 years later by R v Graham-Campbell 
b 237 h" h k d "b h "h' h 'd f exp. Her ert w 1c Loe escr1 es as t e 1g t1 e o 
235 Ibid, 275-76. 
236 Per Stephen, J. Ibid, 285. 
237 [1935] 1 K.B. 602. 
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' d' ' 1 ' ' ' II 238 h' h ' 1 d' d JU 1c1a restr1ct1v1sm, w 1c was previous y 1scusse 
at note 92 supra. 
7.4 Australian Conflict Cases 
In Australia as in New Zealand the power to make rules of 
procedure for the internal business of the House is founded 
statute. 239 The formula commonly adopted according to on 
Campbe11 240 is 'for the orderly business of the House'. 
Rules in State Parliaments require the State Governor's 
consent before they become operative. 
Legally, these rules are no different from any other form of 
delegated legislation, and at first sight should be 
reviewable by the courts if they are not rules for the 
orderly conduct of the House concerned. The Privy Council 
in Harnett v Crick 241 observed that only the House can 
judge whether the occasion has arisen for the making of a 
standing order regulating the business of the House. If 
however on a fair view [i.e. the Courts] it is apparent that 
it [the standing order] is not related to the orderly 
conduct of the House then it is ultra vires. 
2 3 8 Loe k , 6 8 . 
239 e.g. Constitution Act 1901, s50, (Federal); Constitution Act 
1855 s. 34 (Victoria) . 
240 Campbell, 79. 
241 [1908] A.C. 470 at 475 / 6. 
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Assuming that the standing orders are validt is their 
interpretation solely a matter for the Parliament, or is 
there potential for a conflict with the courts? We have 
seen from earlier discussions that the U.Ko view is that 
only Parliament can interpret its own procedures. Differ
ent 
possibilities occur in Australian State jurisdictions not
 
possessing full House of Commons powers, especially in ca
ses 
1 . 
. f b 242 re ating to suspension o mem ers. 
The more interesting cases of potential conflict however 
arise with the discretionary powers of the courts in the 
fields of injunction, and declaratory judgements. In 
Britain it is beyond doubt that courts recognise a measur
e 
to be a valid Act of Parliament even if passed in 
contravention of the standing orders. The British Railwa
ys 
d . k" 243 . h
 . f h" 
Boar v Pie in case is aut ority or t is. Here a 
respondent alleged before the Lords that s. 18 of the 
British Railway Act 1968 had been passed due to the fraud
 by 
242 Barnes v Purcell [1946] Q.S.R. 87; Brown v Cowley (1
895) 6 
QLJ234. 
2 4 3 [ 19 7 4] AC 7 6 5. 
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railways officers thereby misleading Parliament, which 
otherwiss would not have granted various rights. The Lords 
held unanimously that they were not entitled to go behind 
the Act to show that the section should not be enforced or 
look at parliamentary proceedings, to establish the 
respondent's loss, Lord Morris saying, "It must be for 
parliament to lay down and constitute its standing orders 
and further to decide if they have been obeyed •.• it 
would be impractical and undesirable for the High Court to 
enquire. 11244 
The Australian cases relating to the "manner and form" 
provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, of 
245 246 . 
Clayton v Heffron and Trethowan v Peden and its 
subsequent appeals are of interesting historical note, but 
not applicable here as the New Zealand Parliament is no 
longer bound bys. 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. 
The injunction granted in Trethowan's case was granted 
pursuant to a definite statutory requirement, but doubts 
were cast on the decision by Sir Owen Dixon in Clayton v 
247 Heffron. · 
244 May, 91. 
245 (1960) 105 CLR 214. 
246 (1930) 31 S.R. (NSW) 183. 
247 ( 1960) 105 CLR 214. 
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Any arguments put forward against gran ing an injunction at 
any stage of a bill prior to royal assent, thus stopping the 
Bill becoming law, are bound to be based on the premise of 
interfering with parliamentary privilege. The same can be 
said of declaratory judgements as their effect is 
essentially the same. 
On a completely different level the one case where the 
Australian Federal Parliament came into conflict both with 
courts and public opinion, is that of Browne and Fitzpatrick 
- the Bankstown Observer case, which is equally important on 
a discussion on imprisonment as well. 
7.5 Browne and Fitzpatrick - the Bankstown Observer Case 248 
"Serjeant - at-Arms, inform Raymond Edward Fitzpatrick that 
the House will now hear him." Odgers says, "With these 
portentous words the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
on the morning of 10 June 1955, raised the curtain on a 
privilege act which resulted in imprisonment that day, for 
the first time in Federal Parliamentary history, of two men 
f . b h f 1 · . · 1 249 or serious reac o Par 1amentary Pr1v1 ege. 
Fitzpatrick and Browne were publisher and Editor 
respectively of a Sydney local paper. They claimed 
248 J.A. Pettifer. The Bankstown Observer, (The Table 1955) 
83-92, hereafter Pettifer (Table), which provides a full 
account of this case. 
249 Odgers, 654. 
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in print that rumours were about that a federal member, 
Mr Morgan, was involved in an immigration racket, in that he 
obtained entry permits for aliens in exchange for payment. 
The member concerned moved that the matter be referred to a 
Committee of Privileges for investigation and report. (3 May 
1955.) The Clerk advised the committee that not even a 
prima facie case was made out as the charges made against 
the member related not to his conduct as a member but 
matters concerned with his prior legal pr~ctice before he 
became a member. 250 He cited Commons precedents to this 
effect. 251 The Committee obviously ignored this advice and 
proceeded. The committee sought more authority from the 
House to investigate other Observer articles. The Prime 
Minister asked for the documents and evidence and, 
apparently satisfied, the motion to extend powers was 
approved without division. 
Both men were summoned to appear before the committee. 
Fitzpatrick challenged the authority of the committee to 
take evidence on oath and refused to be sworn. He also 
asked for counsel. Counsel was only permitted on two 
points: 
250 Pettifer (Table), 88. 
251 Campbell, 159. 
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(1) Whether persons accused of a breach of parliamentary 
privilege had a legal right to counsel at committee 
hearings; and 
(2) Whether the committee had power to administer oaths. 
The committee decided after hearing legal submissions not to 
allow counsel and that it had the same power as the Commons 
to administer oaths. The evidence has not all been made 
public, but Fitzpatrick openly admitted he intended to 
. . . d M 25 2 N dl h . f d 1nt 1m1 ate organ. ee ess to say, t e committee oun 
"he intended to influence and intimidate Morgan . . in his 
conduct in the House and . 
discrediting him." 253 
. for the express purpose of 
The formal findings of the committee were: 
That Messrs Fitzpatrick and Browne were guilty of a 
serious breach of privilege by publishing articles 
intended to influence and intimidate a member 
(Mr Morgan), in his conduct in the House, and in 
deliberately attempting to impute corrupt conduct as a 
member against him, for the express purpose of 
discrediting and silencing him. The committee 
recommended that the House should take appropriate 
action. 
252 Campbell, 159. 
253 Odgers, 654. 
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That there was no evidence of improper conduct by the 
member in his capacity as a member of the House. 
That some of the references to the Parliament and the 
Committee of Privileges contained in the newspaper 
articles constituted a contempt of the Parliament . 
However, the committee considered the House would best 
consult its own dignity by taking no action in this 
regard. 
On 9 June 1955 the House agreed to the committee's report 
and resolved that Fitzpatrick and Browne be brought to the 
bar of the House. 
Fitzpatrick appeared and again asked for counsel. 
Mr Speaker replied that the resolution of the House entitled 
him personally to speak, not Counsel. (Odger observed leave 
of the House could have been obtained for Counsel to appear 
which would have avoided subsequent criticism that they were 
denied the ordinary rights of accused persons.)
254 
Fitzpatrick apologised. Browne did not; he spoke at length 
in what Campbell called a fine speech (which failed to 
impress) . 255 He rebuked the House for the unjust manner in 
which the proceedings were carried out. He said: 
254 Odgers, 654. 
255 Campbell, 160. 
he was convicted without formal charges; 
he was denied counsel; 
he had no opportunity to confront his accuser or to 
cross-examine; 
there was no appeal. 
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After a 51 - minute suspension the House resumed and the Prime 
Min i ster put the follow i ng mot i on: 
1. That Raymond Edward Fitzpatrick, being guilty of a 
se r ious breach of privilege, be for his offence committed 
to the custody of the person for the time being 
performing the duties of Chief Commissioner of Police at 
Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory or to the 
custody of the keeper of the gaol at such place as 
Mr Speaker from time to time directs and that he be kept 
in custody until the 10th day of September, 1955, or 
until earlier prorogation or dissolution, unless this 
House shall sooner order his discharge. 
2. That Mr Speaker direct John Athol Pettifer, Esquire, the 
Serjeant-at-Arms, with the assistance of such Peace 
Officers of the Commonwealth as he requires, to take the 
said Raymond Edward Fitzpatrick into custody in order to 
his being committed to and kept in custody as provided b y 
this resolution. 
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3. That Mr Speaker issue his warrants accordingly. 
A similar motion was moved in respect of Mr Browne. The 
Leader of the Opposition moved, as an amendment, that both 
motions be amended to read: 
That this House is of opinion that the appropriate action 
to be taken in these cases is the imposition of 
substantial fines and that the amount of such fines and 
the procedure of enforcing them be determined by the 
House forthwith. 
Not surprisingly the dispute then went immediately into the 
legal arena. It had all the ingredients to bring the House 
into conflict with the courts and public opinion. 
Proceedings were immediately instituted in the Australian 
High Court for writs of habeas corpus. 256 It was held that 
the Speaker's warrant was a conclusive answer and no court 
could review it, the Chief Justice rel y ing on the fact that 
if the Commons Speaker had issued the warrant it would have 
been in accordance with law as established in the Sheriff of 
Middlesex case. The warrants were in the traditional 
general terms issued b y the courts and hence unreviewable. 
256 R v Richards 
157 . 
exp Fitzpatrick and Browne (1955) 92 CLR 
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A second line of argument based on a separation of powers 
doctrine and s . 49 of the Federal Constitution also failed. 
Browne and Fitzpatrick petitioned the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. However, 
the Board concluded that the judgment of the High Court was 
unimpeachable and refused leave to appeai.
257 
Not surprisingly the case attracted a great deal of public 
interest. Whilst it was perfectly in accordance with 
parliamentary law, it was clearly offensive as to the first 
principles of justice. The Clerk's disclosure that in his 
opinion the case should never have reached the Committee of 
. · 1 l d d ' . 258 h ' f 1 11 Pr1v1 eges e to 1squ1et. Te Houses re usa to a ow 
legal representation is certainly to be regretted, and its 
period of imprisonment of the offenders cannot be fulJy 
investigated as the evidence has not been made available. 
Whether this is seen as a misuse of parliamentary power is 
for history to determine. Clearly Morgan could have sued 
for defamation in the ordinary courts and perhaps the House 
should have exercised restraint, despite the fact that 
precedent clearly showed that an alternative remedy was not 
a bar to a privilege complaint. 
257 (1955) 92 CLR 171 PC. 
258 Campbell, 161. 
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Australia : Recent Developments 
In order to understand the reasons and to some extent the 
purpose of introducing a Parliamentary Privileges Bill 
(1986), it is necessary to traverse some of the history of 
privilege in Australia, to look at some very recent cases in 
the N.S.W. Supreme Court concerning the trial of Mr Justice 
Murphy, a Judge of the High Court of Australia, and to pay 
some reference to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Parliamentary Privilege which reported in 1984. The cases 
and Joint Committee report have recently resulted in the 
introduction of a bill in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives to reform Parliamentary Privilege. 
Current Privileges 
The Australian Parliament, by virtue of s.49 of the 
Constitution acquired the powers, privileges and immunities 
of the House of Commons as at 1 January 1901, until the 
Parliament otherwise declares otherwise (which has not 
occurred yet). Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688/9 is 
part of the law of Australia by virtue of s.49 of the 
C 
. . 259 onst1tut1on. 
The immunity given in Article 9 is "a privilege essential to 
every free council or legislature 11 •
260 A consequence of 
259 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 per Gibbs ACJ at 35. 
- 1 2 6 0 May, 7 7. 
this immunity is that "a member should be able to speak with 
impunity and without any fear of the consequences
11
•
261 
Equally, the right of either House to conduct inquiries 
where witnesses may speak freely applies: 
"A person with a full knowledge that whatever he says 
will not be used against him opens his mind freely ••• 
he does that under the protection of a standing order, 
and this Court would be failing in its duty if it went 
behind that standing order and allowed to be produced 
to a jury all the evidence given under that 
• II 262 protection. 
Ev i dence given by a witness or documents submitted to a 
parliamentary committee are part of proceedings in 
Parliament as much as debates in the House.
263 No direct 
case can be cited as an authority, but parliamentary 
authorities agree.
264 
261 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 35. 
262 R. v Wainscot (1899) 1 WALR 77 at 85. 
263 Submission of Amicus Curiae instituted by President of 
Senate, in Evidence of Parliamentary Proceedings in Court, 
(presented to the Senate June 1986). 
264 May, 88; Odgers, 476; Pettifer, 632; Halsbury Vol. 34 
para. 1486. 
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In R. v Wainscot
265 the Court held that the protection by 
Parliament of its witnesses must be upheld, and a witness's 
evidence is not admissible against him in subsequent 
proceedings. In Goffin v Donnelly
266 , it was held an action 
for slander does not lie in respect of statements made in 
evidence before a committee. The production of evidence 
rather than its use, have previously been allowed by the 
House subject to proper observance of the law relating to 
the use of that evidence. Courts have also permitted 
evidence of parliamentary proceedings without permission of 
the House, but not contrary to the Bill of Rights. 
"I think that the way the Court complies with Article 9 
of the Bill of Rights, and with the privileges of 
Parliament is not to refuse to admit the evidence but 
to refuse to allow the substance ... to be the subject 
f b . . 
. f 267 o any su m1ss1on or 1n erence. 
Cases involving Mr Justice Murphy 
It was submitted by Counsel acting as amicus curiae and 
268 
instructed by the President of the Senate in R. v Murphy 
265 (1899) 1 WALR 77. 
266 (1881) 6 QBD 307. 
267 Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1985) 50 
ACTR 1 at 5. 
268 Supreme Court of N.S.W. 5 June 1985 Mr Jutice Cantor and 
Supreme Court of N.S.W. 8 April 1986 Mr Justice Hunt. 
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before Mr Justice Cantor and later Mr Justice Hunt, that the 
immunity given in Article 9 prevented the examination of 
witnesses or the accused in criminal proceedings or evidence 
g i ven by them before parliamentary committees, as this would 
involve ' impeaching or questioning in any Court' contrary to 
the provisions of Article 9. 
These submissions were rejected and subsequently during the 
trial a witness and then the accused were cross-examined on 
statements made by them to Senate Committees and submissions 
were made on the matter . 
In Mr Justice Runt's judgment Article 9 is read down, to 
prevent only what is said, or done, in the course of 
parliamentary proceedings, from being the actual subject of 
criminal or civil proceedings. 
It does not in the Judge's view prevent proceedings in 
Parliament being used as evidence of an offence committed 
elsewhere, to support a course of action or to establish 
. . . 269 
motive or 1ntent1on. 
Harry Evans, Clerk-Assistant of the Senate, writing in the 
1 . . 27 0 th Par 1amentar1an sums up e 
269 Parliamentary Privilege : Reasons of Mr Justice Hunt; An 
Analysis, Harry Evans, (Documents presented to Senate), June 
1986. 
270 Parliamentary Privilege in Australia - Breaking with the 
Past, (The Parliamentarian April 1986), 47-51, at 49. 
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effect as, "In other words a witness may well be made to 
suffer for giving evidence to the Parliament, and this is 
precisely what Article 9 is designed to prevent" and, "In 
the case of the accused (Mr Justice Murphy) the use of his 
parliamentary evidence at his trial obviously involves the 
danger of his being punished because of what he said in 
parliamentary proceedings." 
Cantor J. adopted a new test - an adverse effect test - that 
is unless parliamentary proceedings were adversely affected 
evidence could be used.
271 
The effect of these cases was seen in Australia as placing 
the Australian Parliament and the Supreme Court of N.S.W. in 
serious conflict over parliamentary privilege. Evans 
continu~s his commentary by stating ''What most impresses a 
parliamentary clerk about the whole affair is the almost 
total lack of regard on the part of the judiciary and the 
legal profession for the position of Parliament. . It 
was certainly astonishing to observe the complete lack of 
understanding on the part of the practising counsel of the 
position of Parliament .. . It could be well for the 
Parliament to look to the use of its own powers for the 
preservation of its legislative capacity and of the freedom 
f . d. "272 o its debates and procee 1ngs. 
271 Evans 51. 
272 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1986 (Commonwealth of Australia) 
The Bill was introduced into both Houses, and in June 1986 
was introduced into the Senate by the Presiding Officer. 
This is the first time this has occurred and indicated its 
. 273 f h ·11 . h d 274 importance. A copy o t e B1 1s attac e • 
The explanatory note to the Bill states that the Bill has a 
two-fold purpose: 
(a) To provide for change recommended by the Joint Select 
Committee on Parliamenary Privilege; and 
(b) To avoid the consequences of the interpretation of 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1699 by the Judgment of 
Mr Justice Cantor and Mr Justice Hunt of the Supreme 
Court of N.S.W. 
The Bill consists of 17 clauses. A brief analysis of the 
clauses follows: 
Clause 1: Short Note 
Clause 2: Assent provision 
Clause 3: Interpretation 
273 Statement by President to the Senate 4 June 1986. 
274 Appendix 4. 
.. 
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Clause 4: 
Clause 5: 
Clause 6 ( 1) : 
Clause 6(2): 
Clause 8: 
Clause 9: 
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provides that conduct does not constitute an 
offence unless it amounts to interference with 
a House, its Committees or members (not 
recommended by Joint Committee). 
Powers Privileges and Immunities: 
Continue in force unless altered by the bill. 
(Recommendation of Joint Committee.) 
Contempts by defamation against a House or its 
members or committees are abolished. 
(Recommendation of Joint Committee.) 
Penalties: House can impose a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine 
of $5000 on a natural person, and $25,000 on a 
corporation. 
The House's ability to expel members is 
abolished. 
Resolutions and Warrants for Committal. 
LAW LIBRARY 
vicror:·~. , ,, .... ,~ -~1 v o:: ·1::Llli~GTON 
Clause 10: 
Clause 11: 
Clause 12: 
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If a House imposes a penalty of imprisonment, 
the resolutiuon and warrant must now specify 
the particulars. (Recommendation of Joint 
Committee.) 
Reports of Proceedings. 
This clause provides qualified privilege in 
publication of reports of parliamentary 
proceedings (following draft bill proposed by 
Australian Law Reform Commission No. 11, 
1979). 
Publication of tabled papers. 
Absolute privilege for publication by officers 
of a document laid before House. 
(Recommendation of Joint Committee.) 
Protection of Witnesses. 
Creates criminal offence of interfering with 
parliamentary witnesses. 
(Recommendation of Joint Committee.) 
J 
1 
J Clause 13: 
Clause 14: 
Clause 15: 
Clause 16: 
1 
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Unauthorised disclosure of Evidence. 
A criminal offence created of unauthorised 
disclosure of 'in camera' evidence. 
(Not recommended by Joint Committee.) 
Immunities from arrest and attendance before 
Courts. 
Immunity restricted to when House or committee 
sitting and within 5 days before or after 
sitting. (Recommendation of Joint Committee.) 
Application of laws to Parliament House. 
Law in force in Australian Capital territory 
to apply in Parliament House subject to power, 
privileges and immunities of the House and any 
contrary statutory provisions. 
Parliamentary privilege in Court proceedings. 
Purpose to avoid the Hunt and Cantor 
judgments, by declaring Article 9 applies in 
respect of the Australian Parliament and has 
the effect specified in the clause. 
116 
Subc l ause (2) defines "proceedings in Parliament"i 
Subclause (3) prevents use of parliamentary proceedings 
in courts or tribunals; 
Subclause (4) prevents 'in camera' evidence not 
published in the House being used before 
a Court or tribunal'; 
Subclause (5) allows examination of proceedings in 
Parliament in specified cases, such as 
offence under this Act, or a double 
dissolution of Australian Houses. 
Cl ause 17 Certificate 
A certificate of presiding officer or chairman 
of Committee to certify matter relating to 
proceedings is deemed to be evidence of matter 
contained therein. 
Some of the clauses require comment. The overcoming of the 
Hunt and Cantor Judgment needs no further comment having 
been dealt with in the preceding section. The provision of 
a statutory power to fine overcomes doubts expressed in 
Australia albeit the Senate assertion that the power 
exists. 275 Now clearly, if passed, a statutory power to 
fine (in addition to a common law one) would exist. 
275 Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (Final 
Report 1984), para. 7.14. 
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The imprisonment provision provides for a term certain 
rather than the end of the session, and the effect of 
clauses 4 and 9 would mean that any such committal would be 
reviewable by the Courts, so as to determine whether that 
person's conduct was capable of constituting an offence 
defined in clause 4. 
The limitation of civil immunity from 40 days prior to and 
after a sitting is reduced to 5 days which is more in 
keeping with modern day reality. 
The attempt at defining 'proceedings in Parliament' is 
interesting, confined to clause 16, and does not apply in 
general, and is defined as: 
"(2) For the purposes of the provisions of article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights, 1688 as applying in relation to the 
Parliament, and for the purposes of this section, 
"proceedings in Parliament" means all words spoken and 
acts done in the course of, and for purposes of or 
incidental to, the transacting of the business of a 
House or of a committee, and, without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, includes -
(a) the giving of evidence before a House or a 
committee, and evidence so given; 
118 
(b) the presentation or submission of a document to a 
House or a committee, 
(c) the preparation of a document for purposes of or 
incidental to the transacting of any such 
business, and 
(d) the formulationf making or publication of a 
document, including a report, by or pursuant to an 
order of a House or a committee and the document 
so formulated, made or published." 
This I believe does not detract from my earlier comments 
relating to the difficulties of definition and this limited 
attempt at definition reinforces that submission as this 
definition is limited to clause 16. 
A substantive analysis of the legislation when passed will 
no doubt occur in various Australian journals, due to the 
importance of this legislation. Some further comment is 
made in this paper in the reform section. 
9.0 Penalties 
None of the privileges of Parliament would be quite the same 
if the House did not possess the power to punish. May 
states that: 
) 
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"The penal jurisdiction of the Houses is not confined 
to their own Members nor to offences committed in their 
presence, but extends to all contempts of the Houses, 
whether committed by Members or persons who are not 
members, irrespective of whether the offence is 
committed within the House or beyond the walls . • it 
is necessary to emphasize • [that the power] is a 
general power analogous to those possessed by the 
. ,.276 superior courts. 
Penal jurisdiction is, if exercised, the ultimate penalty. 
Interestingly it has been rarely used, never having been 
used in New Zealand, once in Australia as demonstrated in 
277 the Bankstown Observer case, and also rarely in the U.K. 
lately, although over 1000 reported cases can be found over 
the centuries. 278 This lends support for the case that 
parliamentary privilege is known and respected. Whilst 
committal may not have occurred in New Zealand, the other 
276 May, 122. 
277 Supra para 7.5 
278 Wynn 'Treatise on the Jurisdiction of the House of Commons', 
7 . 
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commonly used penalty possessed by the ordinary courts of 
justice - the fine - has, as will be seen shortly. Other 
penalties exist in the parliamentary arsenal. The House can 
reprimand, ask for an apology, exclude media 
representatives, as well as discipline its own members 
ultimately by expulsion. Each of these various penalties 
will be considered in turn. 
9.1 Committal 
By the adoption of the privileges of the House of 
Commons the New Zealand Parliament has acquired this 
power together with the others discussed below. 279 One 
would expect a procedure in imprisoning someone to be 
followed which would reflect judicial procedure in 
similar circumstances. This should particularly be so 
as the power to imprison is of its nature a judicial 
power. But by legislation it has been made a 'power' 
possessed by the legislature. 280 
279 s.4 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865. Now s.242 Legislature 
Act 1908. 
280 Keilley v Carson (1841) 4 Moo PC 63~ supra note 54. 
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Strictly, in theory, however, the rules of natural justice 
do not bind Parliament and no court can review its 
decisions. 
As can be seen from the previous discussions on procedure in 
the New Zealand House, the allowing of accused persons 
representation by Counsel, and advising them of the charge 
removed the possibility of allegations of unjust treatment 
that surfaced in the Bankstown Observer case. 
May describes this particular power as the 'keystone of 
1 . . . 1 ' 281 
h. h b d 
par 1amentary pr1v1 ege . Its 1story as een trace in 
cases described earlier in this paper, namely, Ashby v White 
and Burdett v Abbott, and the power of the courts to review 
it on habeas corpus proceedings has been canvassed in para 7 
supra. The expression of a warrant in general terms, i.e. 
merely stating they are committed for contempt or breach of 
privilege rather than giving specific details, has also been 
commented on in that this is a sufficient return to a habeas 
corpus writ and unreviewable. 
In view of these earlier discussions in other sections, 
nothing further need be said concerning this power. 
281 May, 123. 
122 
9.2 Power to Fine? 
282 
283 
28 4 
285 
286 
The Commons once apparently had the power to fine, but has 
not exercised the power since 1666. 282 It was subsequently 
denied by Lord Mansfield in R v Pitt and R v Mead 283 that 
the Commons had the power to fine. Campbell adopts May's 
1 · · h h . . 284 'f . l'ttl cone us1on wit out es1tat1on; Petti er 1s a 1 e more 
circumspect. Quoting from the 19th Edition (1976) of May he 
states: 285 
"The House of Lords has claimed to be a court of record 
and, as such, to have power to impose fines. May 
states [whether the House of Commons be a court of 
record, it would be difficult to determine, for this 
claim, once firmly maintained, has latterly been 
virtually abandoned, although never distinctly 
286 renounced] . 
Pettifer continues with a quote from Evatt during the debate 
to commit Browne and Fitzpatrick: 
May, 136. 
3 Burr 1335. 
Campbell, 111. 
Pettifer, 665. 
May (19th Ed.) 117. 
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"He [the Prime Minister] has said, without 
qualification, that there is no power resident in the 
House to impose a fine. In the House of Commons, the 
power of fining has certainly not been exercised over a 
great period of time. That, however, does not, in 
itself, prove that the power does not exist. It has 
fallen, as lawyers would say, into disuse or desuetude. 
But I do not agree that it has necessarily gone, and I 
say that if the Parliament is of the opinion that it is 
desirable, it could declare that there is power to 
inflict a fine."
287 
Moreover, the Australian Senate Committee of Privileges in 
its first report stated that the Senate has the power, in 
the enforcement of its privileges, to commit to prison, to 
fine . 
288 Odgers further notes Littlejohn's comments 
. h 1 · . 289 h t th t d 1n Te Par 1amentar1an ta ere are wo groun son 
which the power to fine can be justified, and the fact that 
287 Pettifer, 665; Littlejohn, 52. 
288 Odgers, 651 and PP 163 (1971), 2-3. 
289 C.P. Littlejohn. (The Parliamentarian Vol LIII, July 1972), 
192. 
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it has been exercised in New Zealand on three occasions 
validly . This article of Littlejohn's is a restatement of 
h . . h k . h . h ' 290 . . . t e position e ta es in is t esis. McGee in reviewing 
the conflicting data available says, "Much doubt exists as 
to the power of the House to exact fines •• 291 . Whether 
the House would ever seek to impose a fine in view of the 
conflicting views held on the existence of the power is 
doubtful. 11292 
. l . h h . l d h t f" 293 Litt eJo n as extensive y canvasse t e power o ine. 
The adoption in s . 4 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1865 
of the privileges, immunities and powers of the Commons 
requires for the argument to proceed to ascertain what the 
powers were in the Commons then. The 5th Edition of May 
then current in 1865 contains material on fines, repeated in 
the 6th Edition of 1868, part of which says: 
290 Littlejohn, 46 - 66 and 177-190. 
291 Littlejohn, 190. 
292 McGee, 466. 
293 Supra note 289. 
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II • Acting as a court of record the Commons formerly 
imposed fines .• It is usual for parties to be 
brought to the bar, and after a reprimand by the 
Speaker, to be discharged on payment of fees. • . It 
cannot fail to be remarked that this condition of the 
payment of fees still partakes of the character of a 
fine." 
Recent editions of May, according to Littlejohn, cite the 
proposition propounded above by Lord Mansfield that the 
C h d f . 294 h' . h 1 ommons a no power to ine. However, t is is t e on y 
. d' . 1 h' . 295 . 1 . h JU icia pronouncement on t is question. Litt eJo n 
submitted that Lord Mansfield had misunderstood the history 
of the Commons power to fine, and confused the abolition of 
the Star Chamber with the Commons, as his comment is that 
the case being commented on was in the Star Chamber not the 
Commons. However, Littlejohn observes this is not so as it 
was 25 years after the abolition of the Star Chamber. The 
Commons, he asserted, has had the power to fine and this is 
demonstrated by the quotation of White's case in 1666 which 
occurred from the first edition and in every edition 
. 296 s i nee. 
294 Supra note 293. 
295 Littlejohn, 49. 
296 Ibid; May (20 Ed), 136. 
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It appears that since the passing of the Bill of Rights 
1689 the prohibition in Article 10 of the imposing of 
excessive fines has caused the Commons to cease imposing 
fines as, whatever the level, the possibility arises that it 
might be excessive. 
The abeyance argument is countered by the argument that a 
power to suspend members from the service of the House fell 
into abeyance from 1692 to 1877 and was successfully 
. d 297 revive o 
Littlejohn submits that in the absence of a ruling by the 
Commons or a Court as to the House's power to fine as at 
1 January 1865, the power cannot be conclusively regarded as 
abandoned - it was capable of exercise on that date. And 
since it was exercisable this should be read in the light of 
s. 242 of the Legislature Act which states that the "powers 
held, enjoyed and exercised" and viewed liberally so 
as to interpret the words in the statute to mean exercisable 
so as not to restrict the intention of Parliament as 
expressed in the Act. 298 
297 May, (17 Ed), 105. 
298 Littlejohn, 53-54. 
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His further submission is that in view of the exercise of 
the power to fine on three occasions by the New Zealand 
Parliament, the power to fine has been revived. 299 
These three cases involved: 
(1) In 1896 William Watson, President of the Bank of New 
Zealand, being fined 500 for refusing to answer 
questions before a select committee, which he believed 
conflicted with his common law duty of secrecy 
regarding customers' accounts. 
(2) In 1901 E.A. Cohen was fined 15 when as a member of 
the Parliamentary Press Gallery he published material 
before the committee without authority before the 
committee reported back to the House, and refused to 
reveal his source. 
(3) In 1903 Emil Schwabe was fined 15 and his employer, 
the New Zealand Times, 25 for a similar offence. 
It is important to realise that the most effective penalty 
capable of being imposed on a company is a fine, as it 
cannot be imprisoned. The ability to exclude journalists 
299 Ibid. 
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and/or to reprimand either the journalists or editorial 
staff are not, in the writer's opinion, sufficient remedies. 
In 1929 the Standing Orders Committee in reviewing the 
standing orders stated: 
In view of the uncertainty as to the legal power of the 
legislature in the matter of inflicting fines for 
offences against Parliament • • agreed to recommend 
300 that such power be given to Parliament by statute. 
Whilst no such statute has been forthcoming, McGee adopts 
Littlejohn's comment made earlier that it is doubtful that 
the House would fine without legislation to clarify the 
matter 301 (despite the fact that fines have been imposed in 
the past). 
Littlejohn has a second line of argument regarding the power 
to fine, that it is an inherent common law right. The 
1 d . . '11 C 302 h' d .d d h t ea 1ng case 1s Ke1 ey v arson. T 1s case ec1 e ta 
colonial legislatures have at common law such powers or 
privileges necessary for the proper exercise of their 
functions. 
The case involved an appeal from Newfoundland on an action 
for assault, battery and false imprisonment. The Privy 
300 Minute Book of Standing Orders Committee 1929. 
301 McGee, 467. 
302 (1841) 4 Moo PC 63. 
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Council advised the Legislative Assembly that it lacked 
powers at common law to order the arrest of a stranger it 
wished to punish for a libel concerning a member acting in 
his public capacity • 
Campbell, commenting on this case, remarks that the Judicial 
Committee conceded that it might have taken a different view 
of the matter had it been satisfied that the Assembly or 
other colonial assemblies had continuously exercised a power 
f . l 303 . . l · · o committa . Usage, it said, wou d raise a presumption 
that the power had been conferred by law. 304 It is 
submitted this line of argument could be applied to 
Littlejohn's first argument that since the New Zealand House 
has used the power it was conferred by law. Returning to 
Littlejohn's second argument, he submits that, in a 
situation where a colonial legislature must apply pressure 
which cannot be applied in the ordinary courts, that 
pressure can be in the nature of a fine. In the three New 
Zealand cases the jurisdiction of the courts in compelling 
witnesses to give evidence before select committees was not 
a question raised. The need for select committees to be 
able to obtain evidence was a matter of growing concern to 
Parliament at the time, and therefore it was necessary to 
impose a punishment, namely a fine, which the Courts lacked 
Keilly v Carson, at 76. 
Ibid. 
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jur i sdict i on to do - consequently the fines were imposed as 
a 'necessary ' step and were valid. Therefore a fine was 
imposed in accordance with the principle of necessity in 
Keilley v Carson . He therefore concludes that the imposition 
o f a f i ne is and was valid at common law . 305 
9.3 Reprimand 
The House of Representatives in New Zealand has rarely used 
t hi s method of penalty. 306 A few cases occurred in the last 
century i nvolving members and one case this century has 
307 involved a stranger . May states that the reprimand or 
censure is made in the Commons personally by the Speaker, 308 
whilst McGee points out th i s is not the New Zealand 
. 309 practice. 
9.4 Exclusion of Media 
305 
306 
307 
308 
309 
310 
Cases involving media representatives, particularly leaks 
from select committees, can result in the accreditation of 
Press Gallery members being withdrawn. (e.q. Foley case. 310 ) 
Littlejohn, 65. 
Littlejohn, 197. 
N.Z.P.D (Vol 7 4) , 242-58, 748-68. 
May, 137. 
McGee, 467. 
Foley's Case, supra para. 6 . 3 . 
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The writer's submission is that this is a particularly 
useful penalty particularly in the absence of certainty as 
to the House's power to fine, which would be the only other 
penalty available against a corporate body. 
9.5 Apology 
McGee states that most cases of contempt end in an apology 
being tendered which is normally accepted. 311 
The absence of an apology would undoubtedly affect penalty, 
just as a lack of contrition would in a criminal court. 
An apology tendered is notified by the Committee of 
Privilege to the House together with its recommendation as 
to whether it should be accepted. 312 
9.6 Prosecutions at Law 
May comments that if a breach of privilege is also an 
offence at law the Attorney-General can be directed to 
prosecute as a substitute for, or in addition to, 
proceedings in Parliament. It is submitted that a plea of 
autrefois acquit or convict would not lie, as a breach of 
privilege is not a criminal charge and hence a person 
311 McGee, 469. 
312 Ibid. 
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cannot be convicted or acquitted of a similar charge. McGee 
states that common matters such as disturbance in the 
313 Galleries or trespass are normally left· to the courts. 
Interestingly the only occurrence in New Zealand was where 
the Attorney-General was the one complained of and the House 
directed, after summoning Jones, the editor of the Oamaru 
Mail, to the bar of the House and hearing his explanation, 
"to prosecute according to law for a libel". The 
· f ·1 d 314 s· · 1 1 · f 1·b 1 prosecution ai e . imi ar y prosecutions or 1 e on 
members have been instituted in Australia. 315 
Commissions of Inquiry are another possibility, some 
relationships between this type of proceeding and a 
privilege case can be seen in the MacIntyre case. 316 
9.7 Penalties on Members 
The possibility of expulsion or suspension of members is 
adequately covered in McGee 317 and May. 318 In the light of 
the former commentator's statement that no one has been 
313 McGee, 468. 
314 1877 JHR 63-66. 
315 Campbell, 120. 
316 Supra notes 188 and 189. 
317 McGee, 468-9. 
318 May, 138-9. 
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expelled from the New Zealand Houses and that only one 
suspension has occurred for breach of privilege - there have 
been other suspensions for breaches of order - it is not 
proposed to consider this matter further. 
10.0 Reform 
This paper has not set out to make major recommendations on 
reforming the law of privilege. However, whilst reviewing the 
privileges available a number of reforms have become obvious, 
which will be dealt with in turn, including a comment on the 
proposed Australian Federal Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1986. 
10.1 Proceedings in Parliament 
In particular, the meaning of 'proceedings in 
Parliament' has been canvassed and as one of the major 
I 
planks of the 1966 Commons Select Committee Review, it 
needs some comment. The flexibility in not defining 
what a proceeding is, would, in the writer's view, be 
worth retaining rather than attempting to define 
proceedings in a statute. The very fact that two 
Commons select committees have made recommendations and 
nothinq has happened, says something. No great problems 
have arisen since the Strauss case, other than the Hunt 
and Cantor cases. 
The Australian Joint Select Committee report said: 
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"We acknowledge that there are differing views as to the 
need for clarification of the meaning of the expression 
' proceedings in Parliament'. Some would go further than 
we propose and seek to provide a comprehensive statutory 
definition. Some, while not going so far as to propound a 
comprehensive definition would advocate a specific 
extension to cover communications betweeen Members and 
Min i sters. Others would prefer to let matters stand as 
t hey are and would argue that the very absence of court 
judgrnents in this area is a good reason for assuming that 
it presents no problems . For the reasons we have sought 
to express, we do not think either the more traditional or 
the more radical views should be embraced. But having 
come to t he conc lusion that there are ambiguities and 
uncertain t ies, we think that so far as possible we should 
seek to clarify matters. To do less would be to leave to 
the future a task which we think falls squarely within our 
terms of reference. 
"We therefore recommend: 
(1) That Parliament adopt an expanded definition of 
proceedings in Parliament in the following terms -
'That without in any way limiting the generality of 
the 9th Article of the Bill of Rights or the 
interpretation that would otherwise be given to it, 
for the purposes of a defence of absolute privilege 
I I 
l 
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in actions or prosecutions for defamation the 
expression "proceedings in Parliament" shall include: 
(a) all things said, done or written by a Member or by 
an officer of either House of Parliament or by any 
person ordered or authorised to attend before such 
House, in or in the presence of such House and in 
the course of the sitting of such House and for 
the purposes of the business being or about to be 
transacted, wherever such sitting may be held and 
whether or not it be held in the presence of 
strangers to such House: provided that for the 
purpose aforesaid the exprssion "House" shall be 
deemed to include any committee, sub-committee or 
other group or body of Members or Members and 
officers of either or both of the Houses of 
Parliament appointed by or with the authority of 
such House or Houses for the purposes of carrying 
out any of the functions of or representing such 
House or Houses; 
(b) questions and notices of motion appearing, or 
intended to appear, on the Notice Paper, and 
drafts of questions and motions which, in the case 
of draft questions, are to be put either orally or 
as questions on notice, and in the case of draft 
136 
motions, are intended to be moved , and draft 
speeches i ntended to be made in either House, 
provided in each case they are published no more 
widely than is reasonably necessary; 
(c) written replies or supplementary written replies 
to questions asked by a Member of a Minister of 
the Crown with or without notice as provided for 
in the procedures of the House; 
(d) communcations between Members and the Clerk or 
other officers of the House related to the 
proceedings of the House falling within (a), (b) 
and (c). 
(2) For the purposes of this provision "Member" means a 
Member of either House of Parliament, " Clerk" means 
the Clerk of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives as the case requires and "officer" 
means any person, including the Clerk of Senate or the 
Clerk of the House of Representati ves, not being a 
Member, and who is, or in acting as, a person or a 
Member of a class 
of persons designated by the President of the Senate 
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the 
case requires, for the purposes of the provision. 11319 
319 Para 5.28 and 5.29. 
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However, the bill
320 contained substantially the same 
c:::_ 
broad definition but it is confined in its operation to 
clause 16, and makes no attempt therefore to be a 
substantive definition. It would therefore appear that 
the phrase once again will not be defined broadly. 
10.2 Codification 
Looking at this concept in a wider sense, Pettifer, in 
considering the codification of privilege says: 
"It would be impossible to define every act or omission 
which may constitute a contempt. Within the changing 
role of Parliament and its members, a degree of 
flexibility must exist for the House to deal with new 
circumstances that will arise. New forms of 
obstructions, new functions, and new duties may all 
contribute to new forms of contempt." 321 
Whilst a criticism of this could be that the same could be 
said of the criminal law or accident compensati o n, it 
remains a fact that both the Commons and the Federal 
Australian Parliament have both come out against 
codification. 
320 Appendix 4. 
321 Pettifer, 676. 
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Pettifer suggests journalists in particular call for 
codification in the interests of conformity and call for 
. f . · 1 C . 322 . 1 . some consistency rom Privi ege ommittees. Certain yin 
Australia there may be cause for complaint particularly in 
the context of the Bankstown Observer. There have been 
calls from news media, there does not seem to be the same 
cause for complaint here in New Zealand. 
l0e3 Arrest i n Civil Proceedings 
The Commons clearly believed that the privilege of freedom 
from arrest was outmoded (see para 4.2 supra), and 
recommended this privilege's abolition. In view of the 
fact that the privilege is so limited since it does not 
apply to bankruptcy it is of little value, and should go. 
Even if taking the limited view that freedom from arrest 
must be allowed so as to allow members to attend 
Parliament, 40 days prior to and after parliamentary 
sittings is excessive. 323 Transport facilities have 
improved since pre-Norman days and this privilege should 
catch up with the twentieth century. Despite the machinery 
provisions in the Legislature Act, this area needs reform. 
10.4 Penalties 
The penalties section of this paper canvassed the abilities 
322 Ibid. 
323 Campbell, 73. 
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of the House to impose imprisonment and whether it could 
impose a fine. The Commons suggested the removal of the 
right to imprison, then had second thoughts. In view of its 
non-usage in New Zealand it is certainly questionable if it 
is needed. 
Non-usage, however, could be an argument that it is an 
effective deterrent, and it is submitted that it is a 
useful backstop. Without doubt the most obvious of any 
potential reform, is the clarification of the ability to 
fine. 
Particularly in view of privilege infringement by the 
Press, the writer submits that the most effective remedy 
would be the imposition of a fine on their corporate 
owners. The only remedy that hits a corporation is a fine. 
This is recognised by clause 7 of the Parliamentary 
Privileges Bill 1986 (Commonwealth of Australia), giving a 
power to fine corporations $25,000, and the Canadian House 
of Commons last year recommended that legislation be 
. . f' 324 introduced to impose a ine. 
The provision of any such statutory remedy must, it is 
submitted, be accompanied by sufficient safeguards that the 
principles of natural justice will be complied with. 
Littlejohn propounded 7 points relating to procedural 
reform, namely: 
324 3rd Report of Special Committee on Reform House of Commons, 
Canada, June 1985. 
1. No suggestion of prejudgement; 
2. Referral to a Committee prior to the House ' s 
decision; 
3 . Parliamentary officers available to advise the 
Committee; 
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4. The offender and other parties should be 
encouraged to have the advice of Counsel at any 
meeting; 
5. The procedure before the Committee should be 
quasi-judicial, including the right of examination 
and cross-examination; 
6 • The decisions of the ComJTiittees of Privileges 
should be collected and forms of punishment made 
known - widely published - together with an 
exposition on the subject; 
7 . During any debate on punishment, the House should 
be directed to the requirements of natural 
justice. 
With the exception of the final two points it seems this is 
done. It should be a matter of assistance in part 6 for 
anyone researching the decisions to use McGee, and a 
collection of Privilege Law Reports could be compiled. 
1 
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The question of natural justice is de facto followed. 
However, if any statute to clarify fines is enacted, this 
should also be included. It is also interesting to note 
that clauses 4 and 9 of the Australian Bill effectively give 
the Courts a right to ieview imprisonment imposed by 
Parliament. 
The writer is of the opinion that political decisions should 
( not be made in this area. Whether this is an achievable 
reality is doubtful, as historically privilege has gained 
its place as a powerful parliamentary tool as a result of 
the application of politics, in much the same way as the 
Bill of Rights. 
It is certainly arguable that as the range of possible 
penalties is wide, and the restraints on a Committee of 
Privilege or the House are, in legal theory, limited, that 
essentially the Committee has absolute discretion which is 
unchallengeable, apart from political pressure. 
Consequently, political decisions might be seen as 
inevitable. 
Any review of privilege this year will undoubtedly be 
usefully assisted by the two Commons Select Committees on 
Privilege of recent years (paras 6.1 and 6.2 supra), and the 
Australian Joint Select Committee report as well as the 
proposed Australian legislation. 
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11. Conclusion 
This paper has traced the inherited powers of the House of 
Representatives in New Zealand, from the times of English 
cases to the New Zealand Statutes, and subsequent 
developments. 
Privilege has been defined, and the nature of the body that 
privilege attaches to has been considered~ its duality as a 
' Court' and legislature have been considered, and the 
marr i age of these two functions has been illustrated. 
A detailed look in particular at freedom of speech, and 
proceedings in Parliament has been ~ade; the scope of the 
privileges of the House has been considered. Additionally, 
the procedures adopted when hearing a complaint of breach 
have been dealt with. The potential conflict between the 
Law Courts and Parliament was looked at; and the fact that 
few conflicts have occurred in the last century commented 
upon as showing the responsible attitude adopted by 
Parliament in wielding its powers, the notable case of the 
Bankstown Observer and the imprisonment for 3 months of 
Browne and Fitzpatrick perhaps being an example of a hiccup 
in the system and a warning of what the power of Parliament 
is - and unreviewable if the warrants are worded in general 
terms. (This is proposed to be amended in the 1986 
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Australian Bill, to permit review.) It is notable however 
that in New Zealand imprisonment has never been imposed. 
This is not a good reason, however, for its abolition. 
The question of fines has been reviewed, and a submission 
put forward that the introduction of legislation is needed 
to clarify this, despite the writer's agreement with 
Littlejohn's submission that the power does exist. This 
reform above all others should be dealt with, and soon. It 
is the gap in the otherwise extensive web of privilege. 
A number of potential reforms have been put forward, and 
since completing the first draft of this paper, a proposed 
Parliamentary Privilege Bill has emerged in Australia as a 
result of attacks on Privilege being perceived from the 
N.S.W. Courts, and also as a response to their Joint 
Committee report. This year's review of privilege by the 
/ Standing Orders committee will hopefully address these and 
other questions and is awaited with keen anticipation by the 
writer. 
Appendix 1 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
205. The principal recommendations of Your Committee are a5 follow :-
1. The expression " Parliamentary Privilege" in its customary sense 
should be abolished. The House should speak of its " rights and im-
munities.. rather than " rights and privileges,. and of "contempt" 
rather than "breach of privilege" (Paragraph 14). The Committee 
of Privileges should b:= renamed "The Select Committee of House of 
Commons Rights" (Paragraph 192). 
2. In the future exercise of its penal jurisdiction the House should 
follow the general rule that it should be exercised (a) in any event as 
sparingly as possible and (b) only when the House is satisfied that to 
exercise it is essential in order to provide reasonable protection for the 
House, its Members or its Officers, from such improper obstruction or 
attempt at or threat of obstruction as is causing, or is likely to cause, 
substantial interference with the performance of their respective functions 
(Paragraph 15). 
3. In the ordinary case where a Member has a remedy in the courts 
he should not be permitted to invoke the penal jurisdiction of the 
House in lieu of or in addition to that remedy (Paragraph 42). Nor 
should he normally be permitted to do so to defeat another's remedy 
(Paragraph 47). But the House should retain the ultimate power to 
punish improper obstruction or an attempt or threat of improper 
obstruction of its functions and those of its Members and Officers, 
whenever this may be essential in the pubHc interest (Paragraph 48). 
4. In dealing with complaints of contempt the House should be 
guided by the general principles set out in paragraph 48. 
5. It should be open to the House, in deciding whether or not a 
contempt has been committed, to take into account either the truth 
of, or reasonable belief in the truth of, the allegations made, provided 
that they had been made only after all reasonable investigations h:id 
taken place, had been made in the honest and reasonable belief that it 
was in the public interest to make them and had been published in 
a manner reasonably appropriate to that public interest (Paragraphs 
56 and 58). 
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6. Legislation should be introduced to extend and clarify the scope 
of the defences of absolute and qualified privilege which are available 
in the courts to actions brought against Members and others (Para-
graph 87). 
7. The immunity of Members from arrest in civil suits should b~ 
abandoned and legislation should be introduced for this purpose (Para-
graph 98). 
8. The Speaker should be informed whenever a Member is arrested 
in the course of civil litigation, in the same way that notification is 
given when a Member is arrested on a criminal charge (Paragraph 99). 
9. The immunity of Members (and Officers of the House) from jury 
service should be retained (Paragraph 101). 
10. The inununity of Members and Officers of the House from 
attendance as witnesses should be retained, to the extent only that Mr. 
Speaker upon being informed of the service upon a Member or Officer 
of the House of a subpoena to attend court as a witness should be 
empowered in the name of the House in appropriate cases to require the 
attendance of the Member or Officer at the House in priority to the 
requirements of the subpoena. Legislation for this purpose should be 
introduced (Paragraph 104). 
11. The immunity of Members and Officers of the House from 
appointment as Sheriff should be abandoned and Members (and Officers 
of the House) should be free to accept the office of Sheriff in all cases 
which would not subject them to disqualification (Paragraph 103). 
12. The use of the expression " freedom from molestation " should 
be discontinued insofar as it is used to describe a right of Members 
separate and distinct from the rights which are protected by the ordinary 
penal jurisdiction in contempt (Paragraph 112). 
13. The right to impeach should be formally abandoned, and legis· 
lation should be introduced for this purpose (Paragraph 115). 
14. All resolutions prohibiting the reporting of proceedings of the 
House should be formally rescinded and all rules of practice analogous 
to them should be abandoned (Paragraph 118). 
15. The rules governing public admission to the House and its Com· 
mittees and to other bodies established by or under authority of thi 
House should be amended to provide that: -
(a) save in the case of the House itself or a Standing Committee. 
strangers should be excluded unless it is otherwise decided ; 
(b) unless the House specifically order otherwise in any particul~i 
case, the decision whether to permit strangers to attend should bt 
made by a majority of those voting in the relevant Committee o, 
other body concerned ; and 
(c) unless the House or the parent Committee or other parent bodY 
order otherwise in any particular case, the decision be made bf 
a majority of those voting in the relevant Sub-Committee or other 
subordinate bcdy concerned (Paragraph 129). 
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16. (i) The reporting of the proceedings of the House or of any 
Committee or Sub-Committee of the House should not of itself be 
considered as capable of being a contempt if strangers are admitted 
to the proceedings ; but (ii) the disclosure or publication without the 
required authority of reports of the proceedings of the House, its 
Committees or Sub-Committees from which strangers are excluded 
should be capable of being held to be a contempt (Paragraph 130). 
17. The following conduct should not of itself be regarded as being 
capablo of constituting a contempt of the House and the House should 
resolve accordingly:-
(a) to publish in advance of publication of the relevant Notice 
Papers: -
(i) how any Member in fact voted in a division 
(ii) the contents of any Parliamentary Question or Notice of 
Motion which has in fact been tabled ; 
(b) to publish the expressed intention of a Member to vote in a 
particular manner (or to abstain from voting) or to table a par-
ticular Parliamentary Question or Notice of Motion (Para-
graph 132). 
18. The resolution of 21st April 1837 should be rescinded, and in its 
place the House should resolve in terms of the principles expressed 
in paragraphs 134 and 135, subject to the general rules for the guidance 
of the House proposed in paragraph 48 (Paragraph 136). 
19. The House should retain its penal jurisdiction (Paragraph 146). 
20. The present procedure for raising complaints of contempt should 
be replaced by the system set out in Paragraphs 162 to 175 (Para-
graph 161). 
21. Whenever a complaint of contempt is entertained or is ordered 
to be investigated by the Select Committee of House of Commons 
Rights, the rules set out in Paragraphs 185 to 189 should apply (Para-
graph 184). 
22. Legislation should be introduced to enable the Select Committee 
of House of Commons Rights to authorise legal aid in appropriate 
cases in dealing with complaints of contempt (Paragraph 190). 
23. Legislation should be introduced to empower the House to impose 
fixed periods of imprisonment and fines and to remit, suspend or vary 
any such penalty (Paragraph 197). 
24. A Member who speaks upon a specific topic in which he has a 
financial interest, whether direct or indirect, ought to disclose such 
interest ; the fact that his failure to do so without good cause should be 
capable of being considered a contempt should be clearly understood by 
Members (Paragraph 203). 
30th November 1967. 
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1979 Standing Orders 
426. Appointment of Privileges Committee - At the 
commencement of each Parliament the House shall appoint 
a select committee of five members to consider and 
report upon any matters which may be referred to it by 
the House relating to or concerning the privileges of 
the House or the members thereof. 
427. Raising of matter of privilege - Any member 
wishing to rise a matter of privilege shall refer the 
matter to Mr Speaker in writing before the next sitting 
of the House, or, if the matter occurs in the House, it 
may be referred to Mr Speaker in writing forthwith. Mr 
Speaker shall consider the nature of the complaint or 
alleged breach and determine whether a question of 
privilege is involved. 
428. Procedure when Mr Speaker's ruling given - (1) 
If Mr Speaker rules that any matter referred to him by a 
member involves a question of privilege he shall report 
accordingly to the House at the first opportunity. The 
Leader of the House shall thereupon move that the matter 
be referred to the Committee of Privileges. 
(2) If Mr Speaker rules that any such matter does not 
involve a question of privilege, no motion in relation 
thereto shall be accorded precedence as a matter of 
privilege. 
429. Precedence to matter of privilege - If a matter 
of privilege is raised at any time in the House, until 
it is disposed of or the debate on a motion thereon is 
adjourned, the consideration and decision of every other 
question shall be suspended: 
Provided that precedence over other business shall not 
be given to any motion if the matter has not been raised 
at the earliest opportunity. 
430. Complaint founded on a document - Any member 
complaining to the House of a statement in a newspaper, 
book, or other rublication as a breach of privilege 
shall produce a copy of the newspaper, book, or other 
publication containing the statement in question, and 
shall be prepared to give the name of the printer or 
publisher. 
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1985 Standing Orders 
399. Appointment of Privileges Committee - At the 
commencement of each Parliament a committee, to be known 
as the Privileges Committee, shall be appointed, to 
consider and report upon any matters which may be 
referred to it by the House relating to or concerning 
the privileges of the House or the members thereof. 
400. Raising of matter of privilege - (1) Any member 
wishing to raise a matter of privilege shall refer the 
matter to the Speaker in writing at the earliest 
opportunity and in any case before the next sitting of 
the House, or, if the matter occurs in the House, it may be referred to the Speaker in writing forthwith: 
Provided that matters of privilege relating to the 
conduct of strangers present within the precincts of the 
House may be raised forthwith in the House and dealt 
with in such way as the Speaker may determine. 
(2) The Speaker shall consider the nature of the 
complaint or alleged breach and determine whether a 
question of privilege is involved. 
401. Question of privilege - In considering whether 
or not a matter raised constitutes a question of 
privilege the Speaker shall take account of the degree 
of importance of the matter which is alleged to be a 
breach of privilege or a contempt of the House and shall 
not determine that a question of privilege is involved 
if the matter itself is technical or trivial and does 
not warrant the further attention of the House. 
402. Members to be informed of allegations against 
them - (1) Any member raising a matter of privilege 
which involves another member of the House shall, as 
soon as reasonably practicable after raising the matter, 
fully inform that other member of the matter of 
privilege which has been raised. 
(2) The Speaker shall not report to the House that a 
matter involving another member involves a question of 
privilege without first informing that member that this 
is intended. 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
403. Procedure when Speaker's ruling given - (1) If 
the Speaker considers that any matter raised by a member 
involves a question of privilege this shall be reported 
accordingly to the House at the first opportunity. 
(2) Any matter reported to the House by the Speaker 
as involving a question of privilege shall stand 
referred to the Privileges Committee. 
(3) If the Speaker rules that any such matter does 
not involve a question of privilege, no motion in 
relation thereto shall be accorded precedence as a 
matter of privilege. 
404. Precedence to report of Privileges Committee -
Precedence over other business shall be given to the 
consideration of any report of the Privileges Committee 
on a question of privilege. No member may speak for 
more than 10 minutes in any discussion of a report from 
the Privileges Committee. 
405. Matter of privilege founded on a document - Any 
member raising a matter of privilege concerning a 
statement in a newspaper, book, or other publication 
shall produce a copy of the newspaper, book, or other 
publication containing the statement in question, and 
shall be prepared to give the name of the printer or 
publisher. 
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THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
THE SENATE 
(Mr President) 
A B I L L 
FOR 
DRAFT 
14/pR 
An Act to declare the powers, privileges and immunities of each 
.House of the Parliament and of the members and committees of each 
House, and for related purposes 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen, and the Senate and the House o f 
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Austra l ia, as fo l lows: 
Short title 
1. This Act may be cited as the Parliamentary Privileges Act 
1986. 
Commencement 
2. This Act shall come into operation on the day on which i t 
receives the Royal Assent. 
Interpretation 
3
0 
(1) In this Act , unless the contrary i ntention appears~ 
"committee" means -
(a) a committee of a House or of both Houses, 
including a committee of a whole House and a 
committee established by an Act, or 
(b) a sub-committee of a committee referred to in 
paragraph (a); 
"court" means a federal court - or a court of a State or 
Territory, 
"document" includes a part of a document, 
"House" means a House of the Parliament; 
"member" means a member of a House, 
"tribunal" means any person or body (other than a court or a 
committee) having power to examine witnesses on oath, 
including a Royal Commission or other commission of 
inquiry of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory 
having that power. 
( 2) For the purposes of this Act, the submission of a 
written statement by a person to a House or a committee shall, 
if so ordered by the House or the committee, be deemed to be the 
giving of evidence in accordance with that statement by that 
person before that House or committee. 
(3) In this Act, a reference to an offence against a House 
is a reference to a breach of the privileges or immunities, or a 
contempt, of a House or of the members or committees. 
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Essentiai element of offences 
4. Conduct (including the use of words) does not constitute a n 
offence against a House unless it amounts, or is intended or 
likely to amount, to an improper interference with the · free 
exercise by a House or committee of its authority or functions, 
or with the free performance by a member of the member's duties 
as a memberc 
Powers, privileges and immunities 
So Except to the extent that this Act expressly provides 
otherwise, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House , 
and of the members and the committees of each House, as in fo r ce 
under section 49 of the Constitution immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, continue in force. 
Contempts by defamation abolished 
6 •. (1) Words or acts shall not be taken to be an offence 
against a House by reason only that those words or acts are 
defamatory or critical of the Parliament, a House, a committee or 
a member. 
(2) Sub-section (l) does not apply to words spoken or ac ts 
done in the presence of a House or a committee. 
Penalties imposed by Houses 
7. (1) A House may impose on a person a penalty of 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months for an offence 
against that House determined by that House to have been 
committed by that person. 
(2) A House may impose on a person a fine -
(a) not exceeding $5,000, in the case of a natural person; 
or 
(b) not exceeding $25,000, in the case of a corporation, 
for an offence against that House determined by that House to 
have been committed by that persono 
{3) A fine imposed under sub-section (2) is a debt due to 
the Commonwealth and may be recovered on behalf of the 
Commonwealth in a court of competent jurisdiction by any person 
appointed by a House for that purposeo 
(4) A fine shall not be imposed on 
sub-section ( 2) for an offence for which 
imprisonment is imposed on that person. 
Houses not to expel members 
a person under 
a penalty of 
8c A House does not have power to expel a member from 
membership of a House. 
Resolutions and warrants for committal 
9. Where a House imposes on a person a penalty of imprisonment 
for an offence against that House, the resolution of the House 
imposing the penalty .and the warrant comrni tting the person to 
custody shall set out particulars of the matters determined by 
the House to constitute that offence. 
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Reports of proceedings 
10. ( 1) It is a defence to an action for defamation that the 
defamatory matter was published by the defendant without any 
adoption by the defendant of the substance of the matter, and the 
defamatory matter was contained in a fair and accurate report of 
proceedings at a meeting of a House or a committee. 
(2) Sub-section ( 1) does not apply in respect of matter 
published in contravention of section 13. 
( 3) This section does not deprive a person of any defence 
that would have been available to that person if this section had 
not been enacted. 
Publication of tabled papers 
11. (1) No action, civil or criminal, lies against an officer 
of a House in respect of a publication to a member of a document 
that has been laid before a House. 
( 2) This section does not deprive a person of any defence 
that would have been available to that person if this section had 
not been enacted. 
Protection of witnesses 
12. (1) A person shall not, by fraud, intimidation, force or 
threat, by the offer or promise of any inducement or benefit, or 
by other improper means, influence another person in respect of 
any evidence given or to be given before a House or a committee, 
or induce another person to refrain from giving any such 
evidence. 
Penalty: (a) in the case of a natural person, 
imprisonment for 6 months; or 
$5,000 or 
(b) in the case of a corporation, $25,000c 
(2) A person shall not inflict any penalty or injury upon, or deprive of any benefit, another person on account of= 
(a) the giving or proposed giving of any evidence; or 
(b) any evidence given or to be given, 
before a House or a committee. 
Penalty : (a) in the case of a natural person, imprisonment for 6 months, or 
(b) in the case of a corporation, $25,000c 
$5,000 or 
( 3) Sub-section ( 2) does not prevent the imposition of a penalty by a House in respect of an offence against a House or by a court in respect of an offence against an Act establishing a committee. 
Unauthorised disclosure of evidence 
13. A person shall not, without the authority of a House or a committee, publish or disclose -
(a) a document that has been prepared for the purpose of submission, and submitted, to a House or committee and has been directed by a House or a committee to be treated as evidence taken in camera; or 
(b) any oral evidence taken by a House or a committee in camera, or a report of any such oral evidence, 
unless a House or a committee has published, or authorised the publication of, that document or that oral evidence. 
l 
1 
1 
l 
) 
l 
l 
1 
1 
' upon, 
e; or 
00 or 
of a 
or by 
ing a 
or a 
e of 
? and 
o be 
e in 
the 
Penalty: (a) in the case of a natural person, 
imprisonment for 6 months; or 
(b) in the case of a corporation, $25,000. 
Immunities from arrest and attendance before courts 
14Q Cl) A member -
$5,000 or 
(a) shall not be required to attend before a court or a 
tribunal; and 
(b) shall not be arrested or detained in a civil cause, 
on any day -
( c) on which the House of which that member is a membe r 
meets; 
( d) on which a commit tee of wh.ich that member is a member 
meets; or 
( e) which is within 5 days before or 5 days after a day 
referred to in paragraph (c) or (d). 
(2) An officer of a House -
( a) shall not be required to attend before a court or a 
tribunal; and 
(b) shall not be arrested or detained in a civil cause, 
on any day -
(c) on which a House or a committee upon which that officer 
is required to attend meets; or 
( d) whi ch i s within 5 days before or 5 days after a day referred to in paragraph (c)o 
(3) A person who is required to attend before a House or a 
committee on a day -
(a) shall not be required to at tend before a c ourt or a tribunal; and 
(b) shall not be arrested or detained in a civil cause, 
on that dayo 
C 4) Except as provided by this section, a member, an 
officer of a House and a person required to attend before a House 
or a committee has no immunity from compulsory attendance before 
a court or a tribunal or from arrest or detention in a ci11il 
cause by reason of being a member or such an officer or person. 
Application of laws to Parliament House 
15. It is hereby declared, for the avoidance of doubt, that, 
subject to section 49 of the Constitution and this Act, a law in 
forc e in the Australian Capital Territory applies according to 
its tenor in and in relation to any building in the Territory in 
which a House meets, except as otherwise provided by that law or 
any other l aw . 
Parliamentary privilege in court proceedings 
16. (1) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared and 
enacted that the provisions of article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 
1688 apply in relation to the Parliament of the Commonwealth and, as so applying, are to be taken to have, i n addition to any other 
operation, the effect of the subsequent provisions of this 
section. 
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(2) For the purposes of the provisions of article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights, 1688 as applying in relation to the Parliament, 
and for the purposes of this section, "proceedings in Parliament" 
means all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for 
purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of 
a House or of a committee, and, without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, includes -
(a) the giving of evidence before a House or a 
committee, and evidence so given; 
(b) the presentation or submission of a document to a 
House or a committee; 
(c) the preparation of a document for purposes of or 
incidental to the transacting of any such 
business, and 
(d) the formulation, making or publication of a 
document, including a report, by or pursuant to an 
order of a House or a committee and the document 
so formulated, made or published. 
(3) In proceedings in any court or tribunal, it is not 
lawful for evidence to be tendered or received, questions asked 
or statements, submissions or comments made, concerning 
proceedings in Parliament, by way of, or for the purpose of -
( a) questioning or relying on the truth, motive, 
or good faith of anything forming part 
proceedings in Parliament; 
intention 
of those 
(b) otherwise questioning or establishing the credibility, 
motive, intention or good faith of any person; or 
( c) drawing, or inviting the drawing of, inferences or 
conclusions wholly or partly from anything forming part 
of those proceedings in Parliamentc 
(4) A court or tribunal shall not= 
(a) require to be produced, or admit in to evidence, a 
document that has been prepared for the purpose of 
submission, and submitted, to a House or a committee 
and has been directed by a House or a committee to be 
treated as evidence taken in camera, or admit evidence 
relating to such a document; or 
(b) admit evidence concerning any oral evidence taken by a 
House or a committee in camera or require to be 
produced or admit into evidence a document recording or 
reporting any such oral evidence, 
unless a House or a committee has published, or authorised the 
publication of 1 that document or a report of that oral evidencec 
(5) Nothing in sub-section (3) applies in relation to 
proceedings in a court or tribunal so far as they relate to -
(a) the interpretation of an Act; 
(b) a question arising under section 57 of the 
Constitution; or 
( c) an offence against this Act or an Act establishing a 
committee. 
(6) Without prejudice to the effect that article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights, 1688 had, on its true construction, before the 
commencement of this Act, this section does not affect 
proceedings in a court or a tribunal that commenced before the 
commencement of this Act. 
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Certificates relating to proceedings 
l7e For the purposes of this Act, a certificate signed by or on 
behalf of the President cf the Senate, the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives or a chairman of a committee stating that~ 
(a) a particular document was prepared for the purpose of 
submission, and submitted, to a House or a committee; 
(p) a particular document was directed by a House or a 
committee to be treated as evidence taken in camera; 
(c) certain oral evidence was taken by a committee in 
camera; 
(d) a document was not published or authorised to be 
published by a House or a committee; 
(e) a person is or was an officer of a House; 
(f) an officer is or was required to attend upon a House or 
a committee; 
(g) a person is or was required to attend before a House or 
a committee on a day; 
(h) a day is a day on which a House or a comi~ittee met or 
will meet; or 
(i) a specified fine was imposed on a specified person by a 
House, 
is evidence of the matters contained in the certificate. 
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